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 Unicameralism versus Bicameralism Revisited 
The Case of Romania 
 
IONUŢ APAHIDEANU 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A recurrent public debate topic in Romania, especially since the 
November 22, 2009 referendum, the uni- vs. bi-cameral antinomy represents not 
a mere technicality, but an integral part of a broader and consequential question 
rooted in political philosophy, a quest(ion) of how to design the state 
institutional architecture best suited to foster democracy, security, and prosperity. 
Hence not at all coincidentally, in the overwhelming majority of cases 
worldwide, the one- or two-Chamber structure of the legislature is codified 
constitutionally1, unlike other issues, considered of secondary importance and 
subsequently regulated by law, such as number of legislators, Parliament 
headquarters, or organization and procedures of the legislature’s committees.  
Of additional importance for countries in transition, such as Romania, in 
an extensively shared acknowledgment “that an effective and representative 
legislature is critical to the long-term success of any democratization process”2, 
how many Chambers a “good” Parliament should have remains even today3 an 
extremely controversial issue in constitutional law and political science as well, 
as each of them – the unicameral model, and the bicameral one – presents even 
                                                 
1
  Examples: Poland – art. 95(1): “Legislative power in the Republic of Poland shall be 
exercised by the Sejm and the Senate”; Belgium – art. 36: “The federal legislative power 
is exercised jointly by the King, the House of Representatives and the Senate”; France – 
art. 24(2): “It [the Parliament] comprises the National Assembly and the Senate”; Brazil – 
art. 44: “The legislative power is exercised by the National Congress, which is composed 
of the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate”; Romania – art. 61 (2): “Parliament 
consists of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate”; Sweden – chapter III, art. 1: “The 
Riksdag consists of a single chamber”. 
2
  James KETTERER, “From One Chamber to Two: The Case of Morocco”, Journal of 
Legislative Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, 2001, p. 135. 
3
  A subject of discussion already in the mid-19th century; see for instance John Stuart Mill 
quoted in Samuel C. PATTERSON, Anthony MUGHAN, “Senates and the Theory of 
Bicameralism”, in IDEM, (eds.), Senates: Bicameralism in the Contemporary World, 
Ohio State University Press, Columbus, OH, 1999, p. 1. 
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generically and theoretically, let alone in specific local realities, both strengths 
and weaknesses, both advantages and disadvantages. Furthermore, it often 
happens that each debating side argues the superiority of its preferred model by 
the very same criteria employed by the other side, from for instance adequate 
representation4, to enhanced quality of the law-making process5, or how to best 
cope with the executive and bureaucratic dominance and subsequent pressure 
exerted on Legislatives in the age of globalization. 
Moreover, and not confined to Romania, the public (and sometimes even 
the academic) debate seems regrettably often biased by partisan positioning and 
abundant logical fallacies. To randomly begin with, much of the criticism 
directed prima facie against bicameralism in its entirety seems, at a closer look, 
rather a reproach against one aspect of one particular type of bicameralism, the 
latter’s current variety worldwide being highly spectacular, as I will detail 
below. For instance, one of the most favoured arguments, i.e. unicameralism 
being clearly less expensive and as such preferable to the doubling of resources 
(e.g., money, time, energy, human resources) absorbed by bicameralism refers 
actually, partially recognizable already in the previously underlined word, to the – 
as I shall conceptually clarify below – congruent subtype of a two-Chamber 
Parliament and not to the bicameral generic model in toto. The same applies, 
although in a different direction, to Benjamin Franklin’s widely quoted, despite 
(or exactly because of) its obvious logical fallacy, formulation that a “legislative 
body divided into two branches is like a carriage drawn by one horse in front 
and one behind pulling in opposite direction”.  
Furthermore, some of the arguments promoting unicameralism are not so 
much in favour of unicameralism as rather critically directed against (and 
usually one particular subtype of) bicameralism and vice-versa, as visible for 
instance in the already negative construction of the argument that 
unicameralism bears no duplication, no divided accountability, and/or no 
redundancies, unlike, obviously, bicameralism.  
This does not mean that methodological debate flaws would be confined 
within the unicameralists’ camp. Its opposite side perpetrates equally easy 
recognizable logical fallacies, ranging, for instance: from a combination of 
                                                 
4
  See for instance M. Cotta, who, attempting to elaborate a structural-functional framework 
for Parliaments’ comparison, concluded four decades ago that in terms of representation, a 
second Chamber may provide the possibility of a greater diversity of parliamentary 
personnel and a more accurate representation, while nevertheless being criticizable as a 
deviation from the ideal model of representation, and simultaneously generating possible 
debates with regards to the representational weight assigned to the legislature’s different 
components (Maurizio COTTA, “A Structural-Functional Framework for the Analysis of 
Unicameral and Bicameral Parliaments”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 2, 
no. 3, 1974, pp. 219-221). 
5
  With unicameralists appraising a presupposed superior fluency and celerity of law adoption, 
versus bicameralists emphasizing the quality assurance role exerted by a second Chamber. 
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argumentum ad baculum and “slippery slope” with an odour of anecdotal 
evidence in rhetorical interrogations like “why not directly reduce everything to 
a 10-seat unicameral Parliament, so we don’t have to worry anymore about 
costs?” to the dicto simpliciter type, as for example the repeatedly emphasized 
correlation between population size and the type of Parliament structure 6 , 
conveniently omitting not only the world’s largest state China, but also 
Indonesia, or, in Europe, countries like Ukraine or Turkey, all with unicameral 
Parliaments, despite their considerable population size7; or, from a blurring of 
the delineations between fundamental types of arguments8, when for instance 
arguing in a rather prescriptive manner the empirically undisputable strong 
covariance of a federal type of state structure and a bicameral Parliament 
structure9, to a pervasive form of argumentum ad naturam, in the analogy that 
two eyes, read parliamentary Chambers, see better than a single one. 
As for Romania in particular, the substance and quality of the debate have 
been further deteriorated over the recent years by the interaction of two, 
causally related, aggravating factors: on the one hand the constantly and 
severely low public confidence in the Parliament institution, in comparison to 
both other national institutions and the European average; on the other hand, the 
intense political exploitation of the topic, denounced as such especially by 
opponents of the Constitutional revision project towards a shrunk unicameral 
Parliament10, although one objective observer might easily argue the same about 
both sides involved.  
                                                 
6
  See for instance Dan Pavel, who claims unicameral legislatures would be “typical to small 
states” and former Communist countries (“Puterea legislativă – punctul slab al democraţiei 
consensuale”, Sfera Politicii, vol. 17, no. 140, 2009, p. 15). 
7
  Or, in the opposite direction, conveniently neglecting the empirical fact that second 
Chambers are to be nowadays also found in “dwarf” states such as Grenada (109.590 
inhabitants in 2013), American Samoa (54.719), Antigua and Barbuda (90.156), Bermuda 
(69.467), Saint Lucia (162.781), or Palau (21.108).  
8
  I.e. factual-descriptive, causal-explicative, evaluative-normative, and strategic-prescriptive. 
9
  Notice for instance the difference between these two assertions: (a.) “We mention the fact 
that in federal states, bicameralism is mandatory” [italics in the original] (Claudia GILIA, 
“Reformarea sistemului constituţional românesc – o prioritate?”, Studii de drept românesc, 
vol. 54, no. 2, 2009, p. 163) vs. (b.) “Unitary nations tend to establish unicameral parliaments, 
while federal nations tend to create bicameral assemblies” (Samuel C. PATTERSON, 
Anthony MUGHAN (eds.), Senates… cit., p. 10). Similarly to the latter approach, Bogdan Dima 
acknowledges the statistically striking covariance between state- and Parliament-structure, 
but rejects its relevance, as a country’s option for a uni- or bi-cameral model is one that 
envisages, or should ultimately envisage, the effectiveness of the legislative act (Bogdan 
DIMA, “Parlament bicameral versus parlament unicameral”, Sfera Politicii, vol. 17, no. 140, 
2009, pp. 18-36). 
10
  Who accused president Băsescu of populism, following the latter’s initiation of the 2009 
referendum regarding the restructuring of Romania’s Parliament into a unicameral one, of 
maximum 300 seats.  
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In this context, my paper essentially aims at critically revisiting the 
classic uni- vs. bi-cameralism debate in order to elaborate an operational synthesis 
of arguments and counterarguments applicable to the case of contemporary 
Romania. Subsidiary to this goal and confined geographically mostly to Europe, 
the research starts by addressing the quasi-unanimous interpretation of 
Parliament structure as largely the resultant of historical experiences, which 
condition the option for either uni- or bi-cameralism both objectively and 
subjectively (in the form of historically-modelled public perceptions of one 
particular type of Parliament structure), and respectively not only directly, but 
also mediated by other intermediary variables, such as a certain shared 
definition of the nation (e.g. “ethnic” or “civic”) and of the (nation-)state, the 
configuration of social stratification, the degree of ethnic diversity etc.11 
Secondly, in order to precondition the rigorousness of the debate, I will 
employ a sum of concepts and methodological instruments meant to facilitate 
the differentiation of multiple (sub) types of bicameralism occurring in reality, 
motivated on this enterprise by one scholar’s critical observation that “recent 
theoretical expositions of the benefits of bicameralism are based on implicit assumptions 
that second chambers [all] have... three attributes”12 “symmetry; congruence; an 
adequately perceived legitimacy. Accordingly, the next part of my study addresses 
the actual ‘uni- vs. bi-’” debate in a structure-process format, specifying each time 
to what particular form of bicameralism one perceived strength or weakness 
actually refers, absolutely, or relatively to unicameralism, and simultaneously 
distinguishing between actual arguments in favour of one particular model, by 
contrast to what would rather be qualified as criticism of the opposite model. 
Finally, the last part covers Romania roughly along the same analysis 
units, starting with the identifiable historical factors of the current parliamentary 
configuration, continuing with an exploration of its advantages and 
shortcomings in light of the previous conceptual clarifications, and ending with 
an evaluation of the main arguments’ applicability to it.  
 
 
 
EMPIRICAL APPROACH (CIRCUMSTANTIAL 
GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL ARGUMENTS) 
 
 
Starting from the aforementioned essentially undisputed view among 
field scholars, i.e. that the uni- or bi-cameral structure of today’s Parliaments is 
conditioned to a significant degree by each country’s historical background, 
                                                 
11
  See, among multiple studies on such issues, George TSEBELIS, Jeanette MONEY, 
Bicameralism, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1997. 
12
  Meg RUSSELL, “What Are Second Chambers For?”, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 54, no. 3, 
2001, p. 456. 
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which influences it both directly and indirectly, the map below highlights a 
reasonably juxtaposed model of unicameral, respectively bicameral dominance, 
with the first model seemingly preferred in the North and also in Europe’s 
mostly former Communist South-Eastern periphery, where Romania’s current 
two-Chamber model stands out as an exception.  
 
 
 
Map 1. Europe by Structure of National Parliaments, 2014. 
Legend: [1] = unicameral; [2] = bicameral 
 
Corroborating geography and history allows a reinterpretation of the 
above map in terms of five juxtaposed clusters of states. In the West, 
bicameralism represents the preferred option in: (a) old states (usually former 
empires) emerged out of the feudal order of the Middle Ages (United Kingdom, 
France, Spain, and Portugal as an exception), where bicameralism, associated to 
federal/regional state structures, was meant not only to facilitate parliamentary 
representation of the commoners in order to diffuse social tensions and prevent 
the undermining of public trust in the state, without, however, endangering the 
aristocracy’s interests13, but also to accommodate the pre-existing diversity and 
                                                 
13
  The latter benefiting from a dominant position in the upper Chamber, where aristocrats 
could exert a veto on policies voted in the lower Chamber (George TSEBELIS, Jeanette 
MONEY, Bicameralism, cit., p. 32; Michael CUTRONE, Nolan McCARTY, “Does 
Bicameralism Matter?”, in Barry R. WEINGAST, Donald A. WITTMAN (eds.), The 
Oxford Journal of Political Economy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, pp. 357-372). 
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dynamically balance the interests of the former previous states and communities; in 
broad terms, these legislatures represent vestiges of the past; and in (b) states 
emerged or unified more recently, during the 19th century (Germany, Italy, 
where, in E. Gellner’s terms, a high culture and an idea of a nation preceded the 
state, respectively Belgium, Switzerland, and even Ireland, where bicameralism 
was perceived as a reasonable and viable compromise between the multiple 
historically evolved local/regional identities and the newer state-construction). 
Comparatively, unicameralism characterizes: (c) the Scandinavian cluster, 
where Denmark and Sweden have abandoned their initial two-Chamber formats 
(in 1953 and 1969-1970), a transition also adopted by Iceland (1991), thus joining 
the early 20th century emerged independent states Norway and Finland (plus the 
self-administered territories of Greenland and the Faroe Islands); (d) the relatively 
clear-cut cluster of the European microstates (Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, 
Luxembourg, Liechtenstein), relics of a distant path, most of them monarchic; 
(e) Central and Eastern Europe, where (with the exception of Poland, and, as 
successors to former empires, Russia and Turkey), all states have, in historical 
terms, only recently gained their independence, most having unicameral Parliaments, 
albeit with the considerable, and differently explainable exceptions of: Russia 
and Belarus out of the former USSR; Poland and the Czech Republic in 
Mitteleuropa; respectively Bosnia and Herzegovina and Romania in the Balkans.  
Significantly enough, the historical background of each country 
conditions its option for a certain Parliament structure not only objectively 
(directly or mediated by other intermediary state variables, as for instance state 
structure), but also subjectively, by modelling certain perceptions and 
preferences for one of the two models, a thesis supported by abundant case 
studies undertaken in the field: in Portugal for instance, a second Chamber is 
largely associated by public opinion with the authoritarian regime of Salazar14; 
in Spain, where a unicameral legislature was first introduced by the rather 
liberal Constitution of 1812, there is still a “conventional wisdom” that 
associates unicameralism with liberalism, despite the Senate having been 
revoked by the Republican Constitution of 1931 15 ; in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the post-Communist restoration of second Chambers was largely 
                                                                                                                       
Antonio Marongiu explains bicameralism in relatively similar determinist terms as 
“rooted historically in the highly stratified societies of the Middle Ages and [reflecting] 
the communal spirit of the medieval world” (Antonio MARONGIU, Medieval 
Parliaments: A Comparative Study, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1968, p. 54).  
14
  Philip NORTON, “Adding Value? The Role of Second Chambers”, Asia Pacific Law 
Review, vol. 15, no. 1, 2007, p. 6. 
15
  Martinez SOSPEDRA quoted by Carlos Flores JUBERIAS, “A House in Search of a 
Role: The Senate of Spain”, in Samuel C. PATTERSON, Anthony MUGHAN (eds.), 
Senates… cit., p. 261. 
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tributary to the “resurgence of liberal ideas”16, while in the particular case of 
Romania, as it has been frequently argued, the 1990 reestablishment of 
bicameralism was meant not only as a return to tradition, but also as a specific 
means to antagonistically differentiate the new Parliament from the former 
unicameral Communist one.  
 
 
Global Trends 
 
Zooming out of the European to the global level and focusing, for reasons 
of time and space available, solely on the geographical dimension, without 
taking any historical considerations into account, a 2013 exhaustive overview of 
parliamentary structures throughout the world captures an approximate average 
ratio of 60%-40% between uni- and bi-cameral national legislatures. 
By area, except for the Pacific-Area conglomerate, unicameralism seems 
the most favoured system in – somehow counter-intuitively – Europe (in 68% 
of its independent states, although the ratio is more balanced within the EU), 
while bicameralism ranks as the preferred option only in the aggregate 
Americas area (chosen by 56.4% of its independent countries).  
In terms of trends, an examination of the scholarly literature in the field 
prima facie suggests an ascending trend of the unicameral model: whereas in 
1980 David M. Olson was ascertaining that “the countries worldwide divide 
almost equally between those with unicameral legislatures and those with 
bicameral, or two-Chamber, Parliaments”17, roughly three decades later, the 
Quebecker political scientist Louis Massicotte firmly concluded that “bicameral 
legislatures are vastly outnumbered by unicameral ones” 18 , emphasising 
nevertheless: “There is no clear trend either toward or away from bicameralism”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
  Bernard CHANTEBOUT apud Cynthia CURT, “Modele bicamerale comparate. 
România: monocameralism versus bicameralism”, Transylvanian Review of 
Administrative Sciences, vol. 19, no. 1, 2007, p. 22. 
17
  David M. OLSON, The Legislative Process: A Comparative Perspective, Harper & Row, 
New York, 1980, p. 21. 
18
  Louis MASSICOTTE, “Legislative Unicameralism: A Global Survey and a Few Case 
Studies”, The Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, 2001, p. 151. 
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Table 1 
World’s States and Self-administered Territories 
by Parliament Structure, 2014 (Own Survey) 
 
 
 
1 = unicameral; 2 = bicameral; “(…)” = self-administered territories having a legislative body, 
plus the Holy See; “[…]” = aggregate percentages (states and self-administered territories). 
 
A more detailed diachronic approach however highlights a rather 
complex evolution: 
 
Table 2 
Global Overview of Uni- vs. Bicameral Parliaments’ Ratio Over the Last Three Decades 
 
 1980 1992 1997 2001 2007 2009 2012* 2013a* 2013b 
Bi- 50.0 35.0 33.8 35.4 39.7 40.1 40.4 40.7 41.1 
Uni- 50.0 65.0 66.2 64.6 60.3 59.9 59.6 59.2 58.9 
 
*  includes Slovenia as bicameral; excludes Kosovo (Based on: for 1980-2013a on Inter-Parliamentary 
Figures (IPU)19; 2013b – own exhaustive survey of 202 independent states as of Febr. 15th, 2014). 
                                                 
19
  As quoted by: David OLSON, The Legislative Process… cit., p. 21 – for 1980; George 
TSEBELIS, Bjornerick RASCH, “Patterns of Bicameralism”, in Herbert DOERING, 
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The figures suggest that, whereas during the ’80s, unicameralism had 
registered an ascending trend, as for instance Lijphart20 was stating, and as the 
corroboration of the 1980 and 1992 data would actually confirm it, over the last 
fifteen years the trend has been visibly reversed in favour of bicameralism, 
whose percentage among states worldwide has steadily increased from 33.8% in 
1997 to about 40.7% at the moment of this writing. Yet, keeping in mind that 
such relative frequencies are influenced by the number (and identity) of the 
countries annually surveyed by the Inter/Parliamentary Union, and hence by for 
instance any new wave of emerging independent states (as was the case of 
Yugoslavia’s and USSR’s dismemberments at the beginning of the ’90s)21 and 
their initial option for one legislature model or the other, a heuristically more 
valuable perspective would probably be facilitated by a monitoring of concrete 
“switches” from uni- to bicameralism or the other way around.  
Thus, leaving aside distant examples such as New Zealand (1950)22 , 
Denmark (1953) 23 , or Sweden (1969-1970) 24  and focusing on the last two 
decades, I have identified only five clear cases of countries that turned from bi- 
to uni-cameral legislative structures: Iceland (1991) 25 , the Central African 
                                                                                                                       
Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe, St. Martin’s, New York, 1995, p. 365 – for 
1992; Samuel C. PATTERSON, Anthony MUGHAN (eds.), Senates… cit., p. 8 – for 
1997; Louis MASSICOTTE, “Legislative Unicameralism… cit.”, p. 151; Meg RUSSELL, 
“What Are Second Chambers… cit.”, p. 442, and Andrés MALAMUD, Martín COSTANZO, 
“Subnational Bicameralism: The Argentine Case in Comparative Perspective” (paper 
delivered at the XIXth World Congress of IPSA, Durban, June 29-July 4, 2003), p. 2 – for 
2001; BBC news for March 2007; Bogdan DIMA, “Parlament bicameral…cit.”, p. 21 – for 
2009; own monitoring of IPU website for July 2012 and May 2013a.  
20
  Arend LIJPHART, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in 
Twenty-One Countries, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1984, p. 92. 
21
  Out of the 30 independent states emerged since 1990, 13 have opted initially for a 
bicameral legislature (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Namibia, the Czech Republic, Palau, and South Sudan, plus the 
merger-resulted states Germany (1990) and Yemen (1990)), while the other 17 established 
unicameral Parliaments (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia (for a justification of its classification, see below), the Marshall Islands, Eritrea, 
Micronesia, and Timor-Leste. 
22
  See Keith JACKSON, “The Abolition of New Zealand Upper House Parliament”, in 
Lawrence D. LONGLEY, David M. OLSON (eds.), Two into One: The Politics and 
Processes of National Legislative Cameral Change, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1991, 
pp. 43-76. 
23
  See David ARTER, “One Thing Too Many: The Shift to Unicameralism in Denmark”, in 
Lawrence D. LONGLEY, David M. OLSON (eds.), Two into One… cit., pp. 77-142. 
24
  See Björn Von SYDOW, “Sweden’s Road to a Unicameral Parliament”, in Lawrence D. 
LONGLEY, David M. OLSON (eds.), Two into One… cit., pp. 143-201. 
25
  See Edward SCHNEIER, “Iceland”, in George Thomas KURIAN (ed.), World 
Encyclopedia of Parliaments and Legislatures, vol. I, (Congressional Quarterly), 
Washington, DC, 1998, p. 314. 
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Republic (1991-1993), Peru (1992-1993)26, Venezuela (1999-2000), and Croatia 
(2001). By comparison, the number of states having switched to a two-Chamber 
legislature format has so far reached at least fourteen, thus confirming the 
above-identified trend at global level: Poland (1989), Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(1990), Haiti (1990), Russia (1990), Romania (1990), Mauritania (1992), 
Lesotho (1993), Kazakhstan (1995), Uzbekistan (1995), Morocco (1996), 
Nigeria (1999), Tajikistan (1999), Republic of Congo (2002), and Tunisia 
(2005), to which one might add Slovenia, where in 1992 the National Council, a 
rather advisory and supervisory body has been established, and Malawi, whose 
1994 and 2004 Constitutions stipulate the existence of an attribution-stripped 
Senate. In addition, six countries have registered a switch-reversal, returning to 
their initial bi- or uni-cameral format: Zimbabwe switched in 1989 to a 
unicameral Parliament, only to reintroduce the Senate in 2005; Afghanistan has 
returned to a bicameral model after the overthrow of the Taliban regime; in 
Madagascar, the Senate (1958-1975), abolished during the Second Republic 
(1975-1993), was restored within the Third one (1993-present); South Africa’s 
Senate was dissolved in 1981, reintroduced in 1994, and finally replaced by the 
National Council of Provinces in 1997, thus keeping the bicameral legislative 
structure; after gaining independence, Kyrgyzstan switched in 1991 to a 
bicameral legislature, only to return to a unicameral format in 2007; Nepal 
turned in 1990 to a bicameral Parliament, replaced in 2008 by a unicameral 
legislative body, which however remains suspended since 2012.  
 
 
The Uni- versus Bi- Dimension in Europe 
in Relation to Other Variables  
 
One of the mainstream conclusions reached by field scholars states a 
positive mathematical relation between on the one hand the option for 
bicameralism, and on the other hand the geographic and demographic 
dimension of the country, and, furthermore, its federal structure, while multiple 
authors also take into account as factors ethnic diversity, respectively EU 
membership, which would seem to favour the two-Chamber model27. 
 
 
 
                                                 
26
  See William W. CULVER, “Peru”, in George Thomas KURIAN, World Encyclopedia of 
Parliaments… cit., pp. 537-538. 
27
  See, inter alia, the above quoted works of P. NORTON, C. CURT, A. MALAMUD and 
M. COSTANZO, M. RUSSELL, B. DIMA, or Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of 
Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, Yale 
University Press, New Haven & London, 1999. 
Unicameralism versus Bicameralism Revisited. The Case of Romania 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XIV  no. 1  2014 
57 
Table 3 
Uni- and Bi-cameralism in Extended Europe in Relation to Other Variables, 2013 
 
Variable  
State A B C D E F FRACE QE 
Albania 1 Rep. unitary N parl. 3,001.40 0.0962 0.1856 
Andorra 1 Princ. unitary N parl. 85.3 0.6856 0.7883 
Armenia 1 Rep. unitary N ½-pres. 2,974.20 0.0414 0.0813 
Austria 2 Rep. federal Y parl. 8,221.60 0.1676 0.3052 
Azerbaijan 1 Rep. unitary N ½-pres. 9,590.20 0.1766 0.3185 
Belarus 2 Rep. unitary N ½-pres. 9,625.90 0.2903 0.4909 
Belgium 2 Mon. federal Y parl. 10,444.30 0.5554 0.8735 
BiH 2 Rep. federal N parl. 3,875.70 0.6115 0.8958 
Bulgaria 1 Rep. unitary Y ½-pres. 9,981.60 0.4003 0.6776 
Croatia 1 Rep. unitary N parl. 4,475.60 0.1917 0.3548 
Cyprus 1 Rep. unitary Y presid. 1,155.40 0.3722 0.6612 
Czech Rep. 2 Rep. unitary Y parl. 10,162.90 0.5016 0.8511 
Denmark 1 Mon. unitary Y parl. 5,580.50 0.191 0.3554 
Estonia 1 Rep. unitary Y parl. 1,266.40 0.4618 0.8045 
Finland 1 Rep. unitary Y ½-pres. 5,266.10 0.1245 0.2423 
FYROM 1 Rep. unitary N parl. 2,087.20 0.5213 0.7921 
France 2 Rep. unitary Y ½-pres. 65,951.60 0.1514 0.2794 
Georgia 1 Rep. unitary N ½-pres. 4,555.90 0.2894 0.4864 
Germany 2 Rep. federal Y parl. 81,147.30 0.1585 0.3009 
Greece 1 Rep. unitary Y parl. 10,773.00 0.1302 0.2604 
Hungary 1 Rep. unitary Y parl. 9,939.50 0.1443 0.2765 
Iceland 1 Rep. unitary N parl. 315.3 0.1128 0.2256 
Ireland 2 Rep. unitary Y parl. 4,776.00 0.2298 0.4084 
Italy 2 Rep. regional Y parl. 61,482.30 0.0781 0.1487 
Kosovo 1 Rep. unitary N parl. 1,847.70 0.1472 0.2944 
Latvia 1 Rep. unitary Y parl. 2,178.40 0.5674 0.8098 
Liechtenstein 1 Princ. unitary N parl. 37.1 0.4513 0.9027 
Lithuania 1 Rep. unitary Y ½-pres. 3,515.90 0.289 0.5209 
Luxembourg 1 Duchy unitary Y parl. 514.8 0.5761 0.7613 
Malta 1 Rep. unitary Y parl. 411.3 0.0906 0.1755 
Moldova 1 Rep. unitary N parl. 3,619.90 0.3756 0.5813 
Monaco 1 Princ. unitary N parl. 30.5 0.6838 0.7838 
Montenegro 1 Rep. unitary N parl. 653.5 0.6894 0.7838 
Netherlands 2 Mon. unitary Y parl. 16,805.00 0.342 0.5296 
Norway 1 Mon. unitary N parl. 4,722.70 0.1076 0.2226 
Poland 2 Rep. unitary Y ½-pres. 38,383.80 0.0642 0.1263 
Portugal 1 Rep. unitary Y ½-pres. 10,799.30 0.0198 0.0396 
Romania 2 Rep. unitary Y ½-pres. 21,790.50 0.194 0.3553 
Russia 2 Rep. federal N ½-pres. 142,500.50 0.3464 0.5742 
San Marino 1 Rep. unitary N parl. 32.4 0.574 0.8544 
Serbia 1 Rep. unitary N ½-pres. 7,243.00 0.3105 0.551 
Slovakia 1 Rep. unitary Y ½-pres. 5,488.30 0.2538 0.4645 
Slovenia 1 Rep. unitary Y ½-pres. 1,992.70 0.2942 0.5208 
Spain  2 Mon. regional Y parl. 47,370.50 0.4182 0.6852 
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Sweden 1 Mon. unitary Y parl. 9,119.40 0.1976 0.3601 
Switzerland 2 Rep. confed. N presid. 7,996.00 0.5315 0.7543 
Turkey 1 Rep. unitary N parl. 80,694.50 0.4317 0.716 
U. K. 2 Mon. regional Y parl. 63,395.60 0.2892 0.424 
Ukraine 1 Rep. unitary N ½-pres. 44,573.20 0.3644 0.6452 
 
A = number of national legislature’s Chambers; B = government form: Republic (“Rep.”); 
Monarchy (“Mon.”); Principality (“Princ.”); C = state structure: unitary; federal; regional; 
confederal; D = EU membership: yes (“Y”); no (“N”); E = government system: parliamentary 
(“parl.”); presidential (“presid.”); semi-presidential (“½-presid,”)28; F = state population for 
July 2013 (in thousands), as estimated by the CIA World Factbook 201329; 
FRACE = ethnically applied fragmentation index Taylor-Hudson; based on data regarding ethnic 
structure of states by the CIA World Factbook 2013; calculated as 
 
, 
 
where πi is the proportion of people who belong to the ethnic group i within the total population, 
out of a total number of N different ethnic groups. FRAC’s value span is [0-1), with the value 0 
indicating a perfectly 100% homogenous population, while any increase in the number of groups 
translates into higher values of the index; 
QE = ethnically applied polarization index of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol; based on data 
regarding ethnic structure of states by the CIA World Factbook 2013; calculated by using the 
same coding as above, as 
 
, 
 
it measures the normalized distance of a particular distribution of groups (in this case, ethnic) 
from a perfectly bimodal distribution. Its values range from 0 (i.e. in the case of a homogeneous 
population) to 1 (i.e. in the case of a 50%-50% distribution of two groups)30.  
 
                                                 
28
  Confronted with the widely acknowledged problems of defining semi-presidentialism, I 
chose to develop my above classification based on Maurice Duverger’s definition: “A 
political regime is considered as semi-presidential if the constitution which established it 
combines three elements: (1) the president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage, 
(2) he possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he has opposite him, however, a prime 
minister and ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in 
office only if the parliament does not show its opposition to them” (Maurice DUVERGER, 
“A New Political System Model: Semi-presidential Government”, European Journal of 
Political Research, vol. 8, no. 2, 1980, p. 166). 
29
  See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/. Data for France and 
Sweden are taken from the “Population Statistics” website (http://www.populstat.info). 
Data for Denmark are estimates of the local Statistics Office (http://www.statbank.dk), 
while the figures for Italy are taken from the “Worldstatesmen” website (http://www.wo 
rldstatesmen.org/Italy.htm). All data have been retrieved Febr. 2014.  
30
  For Spain, both FRAC and Q are measured linguistically. For Turkey, both values 
represent averages of the estimation ranges provided by the World Factbook. 
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Out of the seven variables taken into account in the above 2013 
“radiography” of extended Europe, the bi- vs. uni-cameral dimension appears to 
be in: no noteworthy mathematical relation with form of government (grosso 
modo monarchical or republican), nor system of government (parliamentary, 
presidential, or semipresidential)31 or ethnic polarization32; weak to moderate 
relation with the dichotomous variable EU membership33, and ethnic diversity: 
contrary to the relatively widespread assertion that an option for a bicameral 
Legislative would be correlated with a higher ethnic diversity of the state 
population, both uni- and bicameral legislature states stretch over the entire 
fragmentation scale; out of the ten most ethnically fragmented countries in the 
extended European realm, only 3 (Bosnia, Belgium, and Switzerland) have 
bicameral Parliaments; similarly, the difference in terms of average country 
values is also insignificant (FRACE reaches an un-weighted average of 0.29 for 
the bicameral cluster vs. 0.32 for the unicameral one); finally, a restructuring of 
FRACE’s value range into quartiles (from Q1 lowest to Q4 highest) confirms 
the existence of a relationship, one however significantly weak:  
 
FRACE quartile 
Parliament Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total R
2
 (trend) 
Bicameral 10 7 8 8 33 (-).263 
Unicameral 3 5 4 4 16 (+).100 
Total 13 12 12 12 49  
 
Still, Parliament structure is highly correlated with state structure and 
population size: 
 
State structure 
Parliament Federal / regional Unitary Total 
Bicameral 9 7 16 
Unicameral 0 33 33 
Total 9 40 49 
 
In terms of state structure, the strongly correlated bi- vs. uni- option 
manifested in Europe (where all federal or regional states have bicameral 
legislatures, while more than 4/5 of the unitary states’ Parliaments are 
unicameral) closely replicates the global pattern; my own exhaustive 2013 
                                                 
31
  66.6% of the parliamentary systems have unicameral legislatures, compared to 70.6% of 
the semipresidential ones, while the only two cases of presidentialism prevent any 
generalizing conclusion.  
32
  The increasingly arranged quartiles of ethnic polarization present the following 
occurrence of unicameralism: 76.9%; 50%; 66.6%; 66.6%.  
33
  The ratio is visibly more balanced within the EU (55.6% unicameral vs. 44.4% bicameral) 
than outside of the Union (81.8% vs. 18.2% – a disproportion remaining high even when 
filtering countries with populations smaller than 750,000 – 71.4% vs. 28.6%).  
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survey of official national government and Parliament websites and a few dozen 
online country data directories administered by various international agencies 
and institutions has identified worldwide only five federal states that stand out 
as exceptions, having unicameral legislatures: Comoros, the dwarf states of 
Micronesia and Saint Kitts and Nevis, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela34.  
Conclusively, bicameralism seems indeed “identifiable with federal systems, 
where representation and geography entwine”35, although, as it has been duly 
noticed, „roughly 2/3 of today’s parliaments are operating in unitary systems”36.  
As for population, the correlation seems equally spectacular. The 
strikingly opposed slopes of uni- and bi-cameral Parliaments’ distribution by 
country population quartiles thus converge towards confirming the mainstream 
conclusion of scholars, namely that the bigger the state population, the more the 
bicameral, respectively less the unicameral legislatures37: 
 
Population 
Parliament Q1* Q2 Q3 Q4 Total 
R2 
(trend) 
Bicameral – 2 5 9 16 (+) .978 
Unicameral 13 10 7 3 33 (-).994 
Total 13 12 12 12 49  
 
The European pattern closely respects the global one: out of the most 
populated twenty countries of the world, three quarters have bicameral 
Parliaments and only five (China, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Iran, and Turkey38) 
unicameral ones. As to average populations, comparing the 10 most populated 
countries with unicameral legislatures to the corresponding bicameral, the latter 
category records 285.8 million, considerably higher than the average 197.4 
million registered as an average for unicameral systems.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
  Where the 1999-adopted Constitution of 1999 merged the former Congreso and Senado 
into a single 165-seats Asamblea Nacional. See full English text at http://www.venez 
uelaemb.or.kr/english/ConstitutionoftheBolivarianingles.pdf (last accessed March 2014). 
35
  Samuel C. PATTERSON, Anthony MUGHAN (eds.), Senates… cit., p. 22. 
36
  Ibidem, p. 10. 
37
  Meg Russell for instance inventories, for 1996, a global average of 47 million population 
for bicameral states vs. a 24 million one in unicameral states, while out of 22 federal states 
surveyed, 18 had bicameral legislatures, as compared to only 40 of the 156 states (Meg 
RUSSELL, “What Are Second Chambers… cit.”, p. 444, n. 6). 
38
  All cases subject to open debate in terms of democracy. As for the bicameral systems, it 
should be noted, almost all are federal states, which raises questions about the dominant 
independent variable – population or state structure. 
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SETTING THE RULES OF DEBATE: 
UNI- VS. (WHICH) BI-CAMERALISM? 
 
 
As stated in the introduction, the accurate pre-definition of terms seems 
critical to any meaningful debate oriented not only towards mere comparisons, 
but also towards the identification of proper remedies to any undesirable status 
quo. One of the frequent shortcomings affecting the quality of the uni- vs. 
bicameral is fundamentally rooted in the inherent difficulty to define the 
bicameral model. Thus, whereas the meaning and definition of unicameralism 
are satisfactorily simple in both comprehension and explanatory power, i.e. one 
(and only one) legislative assembly, any equivalent enterprise regarding 
bicameralism remains flawed by an unbalanced uniqueness vs. similarity 
tension, failing to capture the extreme variety of today’s bicameral legislatures 
throughout the world. 
Addressing this crucial difficulty, Meg Russell for instance follows 
Lijphart’s classic framework, which I shall address below, in that she also pinpoints 
(a) symmetry (i.e. “reasonably strong powers”, as otherwise upper Chambers 
would have insufficient leverage over government) and (b) incongruence 
(“distinct composition”) as requirements for an effective bicameralism; 
however, looking especially at the UK and Canada as living proofs that the first 
two are insufficient, she adds a third element represented by (c) an adequately 
perceived legitimacy, only to critically notice: “Recent theoretical expositions 
of the benefits of bicameralism are based on implicit assumptions that second 
Chambers have these three attributes”39. This implicit assumption being often 
invalidated in reality, in the following I shall summarize a set of specific 
conceptual elements meant to operate relevant distinctions among various types 
of bicameralism, which I shall consequently apply to Romania’s EU context, as 
a methodological prerequisite for the actual, consequently addressed, 
unicameralism versus bicameralism debate.  
In what could be considered as the seminal scholarly work in the field, 
Arend Lijphart40 has introduced the critical terms of “congruence” (referring 
basically to the political makeup) and “symmetry” (referring to the balance of 
powers) as instruments in analyzing bicameral Parliament’s Chambers. In a 
more refined version41 , attempting to measure parliamentary distribution of 
power, the same author develops a three-tier index of bicameralism, comprising 
the corresponding dimensions: (a) bicameral vs. unicameral (depending on the 
number of Chambers); (b) depending on the power balance between the 
                                                 
39
  Meg RUSSELL, “What Are Second Chambers… cit.”, p. 456. 
40
  Arend LIJPHART, Patterns… cit. 
41
  IDEM, Democracies... cit. 
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Chambers’ symmetrical, moderately symmetrical, respectively (extremely) 
asymmetrical (depending on the (moderate) equality of constitutional powers 
and democratic legitimacy); (c) depending on the similarity of the Chambers’ 
political makeup, congruent (Austria, the Czech Republic, Italy) vs. incongruent 
(e.g. Germany, Spain, France).  
In the same spirit, although with a slightly different terminology, Giovanni 
Sartori42 has instrumented Chamber power and structure as variables in elaborating 
a typology of bicameral systems: depending on the first variable, bicameralism 
may be weak or asymmetric (in case of unequal power, e.g. the UK), strong or 
symmetric (when the Chambers’ power is almost equal, e.g. Germany), or, at 
the extreme end, perfect (i.e. complete equality of the Chambers’ powers, e.g. 
Italy); by the second variable, Sartori dissociates between undifferentiated 
systems (with both Chambers identical in nature, representing populations, or 
sharing the same electoral method, e.g. the Czech Republic, Romania, Italy), or, 
otherwise, differentiated systems (e.g. Austria, Belgium, the UK). 
In relation to the first dimension, among various factors identified in the 
literature that foster incongruence, the most important four would be: (a) selection 
procedure of the Chambers’ members: while the overwhelming majority of the 
world’s second Chambers are directly elected, the selection method of upper 
Chamber members may differ significantly from one country to another: direct 
election (e.g. USA, Australia, Argentina); indirect election/appointment, by 
local/regional/state governments or legislative assemblies, or electoral colleges, 
who in turn elect/appoint the upper Chambers’ members (e.g. Austria, 
Germany, Russia); appointment by the head of state (e.g. Bahrain, Jordan); 
mixed selection, with some of the members directly elected, others indirectly 
and/or appointed (current Afghanistan, Belgium, India); (b) tenure (length and 
simultaneousness), various countries introducing at least one difference, e.g. 
France (6 years for senator (1/3 of them renewed every 3 years) vs. 5 for deputies), 
the Czech Republic (6 (1/3 renewed every 2 years) vs. 4), Australia (6 (of which 
1/2 renewed every 3 years); (c) eligibility minimum age requisite – usually 
higher for upper Chambers’ members (e.g. 30 vs. 18 in Canada; 35 vs. 23 in 
France; 40 vs. 25 in Italy); (d) Chamber size – upper Chambers are usually 
smaller than corresponding lower ones. 
The EU member states’ bicameral legislatures seem equally diverse in 
terms of their (in-)congruence; on the basis of an empirical research operated in 
the ’90s in Western Europe, Tsebelis and Rasch, who prefer the more refined 
instrument of “distance” to the classic “incongruence”, concluded that,  
 
“[while] existing procedures of upper and lower Chamber selection in all but two 
countries (Iceland and Norway) don’t guarantee small ideological distances (or 
                                                 
42
  Giovanni SARTORI, Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, 
Incentives and Outcomes, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1994, pp. 183-189. 
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congruence), […] however, examination of the post-World War II results indicates that 
distances between upper and lower houses have been small in other three countries: 
Belgium, Netherlands, and Italy”43. 
 
Eighteen years later, my own investigation of the political makeup of all 
the 12 EU member states’ bicameral legislatures, based on official Parliaments’ 
websites, shows not only a preservation of the incongruence in the cases 
identified by the aforementioned authors, but also that the two out of the three 
newest member states’ bicameral Parliaments (Poland and Romania) also have 
congruent Chambers, which means that at the time of writing 7 (out of 12) EU 
member states have bicameral incongruent Parliaments: Austria, the Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, Ireland, Spain, and the UK: 
 
Table 4 
Contemporary Variety of EU Bicameral National Legislatures by Different Criteria44 
 
Variable 
 
State 
(Chamber) 
Upper Chamber 
selection method Congruence 
Resolution of 
inter-chamber 
disagreements 
State: 
federal / 
regional 
Austria 
(Bundesrat) 
Indirect: appointed by state 
parliaments, proportionally 
to state population 
no 
navette 
(lower house 
decisive) 
yes 
Belgium 
(Senaat, 
Senate) 
 40/71 direct proportional 
 21 appointed by regional 
parliaments 
 10 co-opted by (other) 
senators 
 hereditary for King’s 
childrena 
yesa navette yes 
Czech Rep. 
(Senát) 
Direct (1/3 elected every 2 
years) no 
upper house 
decisive no 
France 
(Senate) 
Indirect: appointed by 
electoral college (1/3 elected 
every 3 years) 
no no 
Germany 
(Bundesrat) 
Indirect: appointed by state 
governments proportional to 
population 
no yes 
Ireland 
(Seanad) 
 49/60 directly elected by 
universities from 
candidates of vocational 
panels; 
 11/60 appointed by prime 
minister; 
no 
navette 
(followed by 
joint committee 
or lower house 
decisive) 
 
no 
                                                 
43
  George TSEBELIS, Bjornerick RASCH, “Patterns of Bicameralism”, cit., pp. 365-390. 
44
  Ibidem, pp. 369-370 (own adaptation, update and adding on the basis of state Constitutions). 
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Italy 
(Senato) 
 315 direct proportional; 
 3 lifetime senators 
appointed by the 
President; 
yes navette yes 
Netherlands 
(Eerste 
Kamer) 
Indirect by 12 provincial 
councils yes 
navette 
(upper house 
decisive) 
yes 
Poland 
(Senat) 
Direct majority province 
vote yes 
upper house 
decisive no 
Romania 
(Senat) 
Direct, mixed electoral 
system yes 
thematic-
defined 
distinction 
between first 
notified and 
decisional 
Chamber 
no 
Spain 
(Senado) 
 208/257 direct  
 49/257 appointed by 
regional legislatures 
no 
navette 
(followed by 
join committee) 
yes 
United 
Kingdom 
(House of 
the Lords) 
Hereditary and appointed by 
the Queenb no 
navette 
(lower house 
decisive) 
yes 
 
a
  The so-called “Butterfly Agreement” of 2011 has decided on abolishing, starting with 
2014, the direct election of the Senate, which is to become a smaller-sized assembly 
of the regional Parliaments45. 
b
  As of March 1, 2014: 668 life peers, 87 hereditary peers, and 26 bishops46. 
  
In terms of symmetry, the overwhelming rule indicates an asymmetry in 
favour of the (universally directly elected) lower Chamber47, with the world’s 
bicameral Parliaments distributed along a continuum from extreme asymmetry 
(e.g. the UK, where the lower House of Commons may override the decisions 
of the Lords, whose attributes have in time become merely consultative, one 
might even say ceremonial) to a quasi-perfect symmetry (e.g. Italy, or Romania 
prior to the 2003 Constitution revision). 
Aside from specific, explicit Constitutional and/or legal provisions regarding 
the Chambers’ powers in terms of concrete attributes and prerogatives, the 
general asymmetry in favour of lower Chambers48 is primarily reflected in the 
                                                 
45
  See the official Dutch text of the agreement at http://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/pdf_sect 
ions/home/NLdirupo.pdf (retrieved September 2013).  
46
  See the official legislature website information at http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-
and-offices/lords/composition-of-the-lords/ (retrieved March 2013).  
47
  Ioan MURARU, Mihai CONSTANTINESCU, Drept parlamentar românesc, Gramar, 
Bucureşti, 1994, p. 44.  
48
  The lower Chamber majority required to overrule an upper Chamber’s veto differing 
between countries. In Slovenia for instance, the upper National Council can veto within 7 
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mechanisms employed to reconcile inter-Chamber differences, empirical studies 
of European bicameralism having so far identified an upper Chamber as 
decisive in only two cases – the Netherlands and Poland49. Tsebelis and Rasch50 
have identified various such mechanisms applied to solve a bill adoption dispute 
between Chambers: (a) establishing of a joint committee/mediation (e.g. Germany, 
Romania prior to 2003); (b) the navette/shuttle system, as a mechanism of 
sending a bill, as modified, from one Chamber to the other, each making an 
offer that the other either accepts integrally, or modifies it and subsequently 
makes a counter offer, a system which: (b1) can continue indefinitely (e.g. 
Belgium, Italy51); or (b2) end immediately (e.g. Netherlands, where the upper 
Chamber can either fully accept, or entirely reject the lower Chamber’s proposal; 
continue for a finite number of rounds (e.g. France, Spain, UK, Austria); 
(c) non-reconciliation, when the power of each Chamber is regulated by the 
Constitution or the law depending on the nature of the issue debated (functional 
partitioning of the Chambers as in Romania post-2003, or South Africa).  
Broadening the approach beyond the (a-)symmetry and (in-)congruence 
dimensions, Philip Norton52 fundamentally dissociates, as far as parliamentary 
Chambers are concerned, between functions (i.e. representation and reflection) 
and capacity, the latter comprising, together with formal powers (the 
correspondent of [a-]symmetry) and composition (the correspondent of [in-
]congruence), also political will, a factor which is influenced by the local 
political customs and traditions developed in time, and which indeed seems 
largely neglected, despite its potentially crucial implications, inclusively on the 
very significance of congruence and symmetry53.  
In reference to Norton’s distinction between a de jure vs. a de facto 
dichotomy between “constitutional designation” and “institutional design”, 
Slovenia seems a peculiar case; its Slovenia’s 2000-adopted Constitution 54 
stipulates, along the 90-seats National Assembly (Državni zbor) as the (main) 
legislative state authority, the existence of a 40-seat National Council (Državni 
                                                                                                                       
days any bill adopted by the lower Chamber, which can however override the veto by a 
simple majority, whereas in Russia, the State Duma is required a 2/3 majority to reject the 
Federation Council’s veto. 
49
  George TSEBELIS, Bjornerick RASCH, “Patterns of Bicameralism”, cit., p. 371. 
50
  Ibidem. 
51
  Not coincidentally, the two EU member states with the highest post-War governmental 
instability. 
52
  Philip NORTON, “Adding Value?... cit.”, pp. 7-8. 
53
  See for instance the statement of the former Canadian senator Keith Davey: “Although we 
are not elected, we can block any and all legislation passed by the duly elected House of 
Commons. Not that we would ever use our powerful veto, given our unelected status. If 
we did, it would immediately be taken away from us, and so it should be” (Keith 
DAVEY, The Rainmaker: A Passion for Politics, Stoddart, Toronto, 1986, p. 306). 
54
  Chapter IV, art. 80-95 and 96-101(official bilingual text available at http://www.pf.uni-
mb.si/datoteke/janja/Angleska%20PT/anglesko-slovenska_urs.pdf, last accessed 30th May, 2013). 
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svet), which, in the absence of a specific, expressis verbis, provision of the 
Constitution, is often interpreted by scholars as a second legislative Chamber. 
However, since article 96 of the Constitution defines the latter as “the 
representative body for social, economic, professional and local interests” and 
stipulates its organization by law, while art. 97 drastically limits its 
prerogatives, making it essentially an advisory, and not a legislating body55, I 
have chosen to consider it a unicameral type56. 
Finally, integrating a multitude of criteria ranging from historical 
emergence to selection procedures of members, Dietrich Tränhardt identifies no 
less than nine currently existing versions of bicameralism: 1.) nobility second 
Chamber bicameralism, of medieval roots (e.g., UK’s House of Lords); 2.) the 
Federal Senate, as a US trademark later imported in Latin America, 
Switzerland, Australia, or the Philippines; 3.) with a territorial-base indirectly 
elected second Chamber (e.g. France); 4.) the German model of the Bundesrat; 
5.) the guild/corporate based model, nowadays (after the abolition of the 
German Senate) occurring only in Ireland; 6.) the appointed upper Chamber 
model, typical to former British colonies (e.g. Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Fiji, Grenada, Saint Lucia, Jamaica, or Trinidad Tobago; 
7.) the second legitimate forum model (e.g. Japan, Australia); 8.) the identity 
solution (e.g. Italy); 9.) quasi-bicameralism (e.g. Nebraska’s state legislature)57.  
 
 
 
STRUCTURAL-PROCEDURAL ARGUMENTS 
OF THE DEBATE 
 
 
Aside from what exactly should be compared, meaning unicameralism 
versus what type of bicameralism, the immediately arising question refers to 
what features of the two systems to compare, in the larger and more significant 
context of the all-encompassing question of “What makes a good institution?”. 
                                                 
55
  The National Council may for instance propose law drafts to be adopted by the National 
Assembly; convey to the National Assembly its opinion on certain matters; ask for 
National Assembly re-examination of an adopted law prior to promulgation; require the 
calling of a referendum, or inquiries on certain matters of public importance; respectively, 
when asked by the National Assembly, it must express its opinion on individual issues. 
For a more detailed analysis of the Slovenian case, see Alpár Zoltán SZÁSZ, “Sistemul 
politic din Slovenia: aspecte ale tranziţiei”, Europolis, vol. 1, no. 1, 2002, p. 123. 
56
  Contrary to the IPU, who list Slovenia’s Parliament as bicameral. 
57
  Dietrich TRÄNHARDT, „Mehr Demokratie oder mehr Gewaltenteilung?”, in Christiane 
FRANTZ, Klaus SCHUBERT (eds.), Einführung in die Politikwissenschaft, Lit, 
Hamburg, 2010, pp. 91-111. 
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Given the topic’s relevance already a century and a half ago, the constitutional 
law literature devoted to the unicameralism versus bicameralism debate has in 
time witnessed innumerable and simultaneously extremely diverse accounts of 
both models’ arguments and counterarguments, advantages and disadvantages, 
strengths and weaknesses, spanning from psychological conjectures, as for 
instance the assumed risk of conflict, or at least rivalry, which might be 
generated between two Chambers, to incredibly technical arguments related to 
the structure and procedures of parliamentary subcommittees; or from 
arguments of political philosophy nature, such as the theory of checks and 
balances in party-dominated political systems, to, derived from economics, 
attempts to establish institutional performance indicators and accordingly 
hierarchize the two models.  
Based on works written in the field by both scholars and practitioners, the 
following synthesis structures the debate by each comparative analysis unit (i.e. 
the comparison criteria employed), while also distinguishing among arguments 
in the true meaning of the term (positive arguments in favour of one model), 
criticism of the other model (negative arguments), respectively counterarguments, 
or criticism rebuttal. 
 
UNICAMERAL [1] BICAMERAL [2] 
Sovereignty 
Argument:  
One people, one representation. 
Critique:  
Forcibly divides sovereignty, which is “unique, 
indivisible, inalienable and imprescriptible”58 
 
Rebuttal:  
1. The critique is normative and 
prescriptive, stating what would be good 
and what should be done, instead of what 
is: in a 21st century prominently marked 
by interdependence, intergovernmental 
and supranational structures, all states 
have partitioned sovereignty. 
2. Even if so, it’s not the sovereignty of the 
people, but its representation that would 
be (conventionally) divided59. 
                                                 
58
  The French Constitution of September 4th, 1791, in accordance to the philosophical line 
initiated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau: “Sovereignty, for the same reason as makes it 
inalienable, is indivisible; for will either is, or is not, general” (The Social Contract or 
Principles of Political Right, 1762, II, ii). The idea marked a long time mainstream of 
uninterrupted continuity in political thought, and has been embraced as such even in the 
aftermath of World War Two by the patriarch of Realism in International Relations, Hans 
J. Morgenthau: “Sovereignty over the same territory cannot reside simultaneously in two 
different authorities, that is, sovereignty is indivisible”, where sovereignty is “the supreme 
legal authority of the nation to give and enforce the law within a certain territory” (Hans J. 
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Comment:  
The Rousseau-inspired, long time juridical and political mainstream view on sovereignty has 
in time lost both its descriptive and explanatory power. In the age of globalization, which 
fosters a dismantling of the national in favour a transnational rearticulating of territory-
authority-rights subsets60, and all the more within the European Union, (traditionally nation-) 
have been targets of a “triple attack”: 1.) top-down, by supranational integration; 2.) bottom-
up, by seceding movements and local identities; 3.) on the horizontal, by migration. 
Consequently, sovereignty has ceased to be a dichotomous variable (i.e. sovereign or not?), 
becoming an ordinal one (i.e. sovereign to what extent?). 
 
Representation 
Philosophy:  
Singular, unified representation of one people. 
 
Critique:  
Fails to capture contemporary societies’ 
diversity and properly represent it. 
 
 
 
 
 
Rebuttal:  
Inopportunity; aside from cases of federal 
structure, states cannot, or should not, invent 
a new Parliament Chamber for each of the 
innumerable cleavages occurring in 
contemporary society. 
Argument:  
In the context of today’s increasingly 
complex and fragmented societies, [2]-ism 
represents the optimal format for adequately 
representing different sets of interests, which 
a [1] legislature might ignore, e.g. state, 
region, ethnicity, occupation. Philosophically, 
the idea of bicameralism is rooted in the 
principles of pluralism and consensus as 
crucial features of democracy.  
 
Critique:  
1. Ibidem; 
2. Elitism: if upper Chambers are elected 
indirectly, let alone appointed, and, 
furthermore, they represent “local and 
elite interests and also control the power 
to dissolve the government”61, there 
arises a risk of them representing rather 
notables than the people, hence the 
subsequent cost of a democratic deficit62. 
 
Rebuttal:  
Truly democratic regimes are pluralistic and 
prevent the tyranny of the majority. 
 
Critique: 
3. In the context of the generalization of 
Constitutional Courts, the relevance of 
                                                                                                                       
MORGENTHAU, “The Problem of Sovereignty Reconsidered”, Columbia Law Review, 
vol. 48, no. 3, 1948, p. 316).  
59
  Article 2(1) of Romania’s 2003 Constitution for instance stipulates: “The national 
sovereignty shall reside with the Romanian people that shall exercise it by means of their 
representative bodies, resulting from free, periodical and fair elections, as well as by 
referendum” (official translation on the Parliament’s website).  
60
  See Saskia SASSEN, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 2008.  
61
  James P. KETTERER, “From One Chamber to Two… cit.”, p. 136. 
62
  Ramona DUMINICĂ, Andreea DRĂGHICI, “A Few Considerations on the Structure of 
the Romanian Parliament within the European Context”, AGORA International Journal of 
Juridical Sciences, vol. 5, no. 2, 2010, pp. 73-79. 
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upper Chambers’ representation systems 
is further questioned by the former’s 
control replacement of the type of 
political censorship previously exerted by 
the upper Chambers63. 
 
Rebuttal:  
The functional differentiation between 
Constitutional Courts, who exert a 
Constitutional control, and Parliaments, who 
legislate, is and will remain preserved. 
Comment:  
Except for federal states, which apply a combination of the national and territorial representation 
principles64, or, to a lesser degree, states structured in regions, the crucial factor of adequate 
representation and responsiveness to diverse societal issues and interests lies fundamentally 
not in the number of legislating bodies, but in the electoral system65. Ethnic minorities’ 
interests do not require a separate legislative Chamber; their representation in a unicameral 
legislature can be regulated by quotas or systems of proportional representation66. 
A second Chamber seems of limited usefulness in unitary states, and all the less so in those 
with homogenous populations and weak local identities.  
With the necessary amendment that in the overwhelming majority of cases, second Chambers 
are powerless in revoking a government on their own (and vice-versa), the second critique 
against the bicameral model raises indeed a fundamental question of whom and why to 
legislatively represent. In terms of responsibility, the unicameral model favours the majority 
rule, while the bicameral one restrains it, favoring pluralism. 
 
Civic participation 
Argument:  
Transparent and simple to be understood 
and followed, unicameralism encourages 
broad public participation in legislative 
decisions. 
Argument:  
Bicameralism offers more debate forums, more 
opportunities of deliberation, more hearings etc., 
where individual citizens and their representative 
organizations can participate freely67. 
Comment:  
Whether or not participation is perceived as a burden in bicameral systems, as some 
unicameralists argue, remains a debatable conjecture68 in the absence of comprehensive 
                                                                                                                       
63
   C.P.A.R.P.C.R., Raportul Comisiei Prezidenţiale de Analiză a Regimului Politic şi Constituţional 
din România: Pentru Consolidarea Statului de Drept, C.H. Beck, Bucureşti, 2009, p. 43.  
64
  Ion DELEANU, Instituţii şi proceduri constituţionale – în dreptul român şi în dreptul 
comparat, C.H. Beck, Bucureşti, 2006, p. 613. 
65
  Tom TODD, “Unicameral or Bicameral State Legislatures: The Policy Debate”, 
Minnesota House of Representatives, Research Department, St. Paul, MN, 1999, p. 2. 
66
  For instance, art. 62(2) of Romania’s Constitution guarantees a seat in the Chamber of 
Deputies for each of the officially recognized national minorities whose representative 
organization fails to surpass the standard electoral threshold; in Cyprus, even if the 
provision still can’t be put into practice because of the protracted crisis over Northern 
Cyprus, the fundamental law’s art. 62(1) guarantees a proportional 2/3-1/3 representation 
of the Greek and Turkish communities in the unicameral House of Representatives. 
67
  Both arguments listed by Tom TODD, “Unicameral or Bicameral State Legislatures… cit.”, p. 10.  
68
  And so does, generically, the legislators’ responsibility towards their electors, although 
some authors argue for instance that, even in its highly congruent version, it increases the 
likelihood of direct, consistent contact between legislators and electors, so that citizens’ 
petitions are heard (ibidem, p. 2). 
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empirical studies comparing civic participation in uni- and bi-cameral systems, studies that 
would also need to take into account a multitude of interfering independent and intermediary 
variables, ranging from instance from the broader element of the country’s dominant political 
culture to the technical issue of the hearing committees’ work program. 
 
Checks and balances 
a) Intra-parliamentary 
Critique:  
Concentrates, instead of separating and 
balancing, power within the legislature; risk: 
Parliament becomes arrogant, acts 
autocratically and arbitrarily69. 
 
Rebuttal:  
A unicameral legislature is already checked 
and balanced not only by the executive and 
judicial branches, in full compliance with 
Montesquieu’s principle, but also controlled 
by the electorate, Constitutional courts, and 
various international and supranational 
agencies and institutions. 
 
Counterargument: 
The above are unreliable instruments of 
control; they are no substitute for the 
safeguard of restraining the legislature’s 
power by dividing the legislature itself in a 
bicameral structure that fosters self-criticism 
and enhanced detection of error. 
 
Rebuttal  
1. The critique implicitly refers only to 
incongruent and symmetrical bicameral 
systems. In all other cases, the second 
Chamber remains redundant70. 
2. Globalization is an age of executive, 
bureaucratic, and judicial dominance, 
when “the problem with legislatures is 
infirmity, not prowess”71; concentration 
of power in a one-Chamber Parliament 
restores the proper balance among the 
three branches of Government. 
Argument:  
The need to divide power, even intra-
parliamentary, so that the Chambers mutually 
deter/coerce themselves from becoming 
authoritarian, or from supporting such a 
regime. Thus, the utility of the second 
Chamber lies in its potential “veto player” 
role. Philosophically, bicameralism reflects a 
transposition at intra-parliamentary level of 
the checks and balances principle. 
 
Critique:  
1. Bicameral systems also concentrate 
power, but in the hands of a few 
influential members, like those who serve 
in important committees and those who 
appoint them.  
2. Moreover, even if the second Chamber 
expresses a veto, the lower Chamber is 
decisive in almost all countries, so that 
the upper one seems once more redundant 
from the herein discussed criterion. 
 
 
                                                 
69
  In John Stuart Mill’s words: “A majority in a single assembly, when it has assumed a 
permanent character […] easily becomes despotic and overwhelming, if released from the 
necessity of considering whether its acts will be concurred in by another constituted authority” 
(apud Samuel C. PATTERSON, Anthony MUGHAN (eds.), Senates… cit., pp. 12-13). 
70
  Especially in asymmetrical and congruent systems, when “the problem isn’t in having two 
Houses, it’s having one that is so in thrall to the whims of the minority” (E.D. KAIN, 
“Unicameralism Is Fine, but So Is Bicameralism without a Filibuster”, American Times, 
May 19th, 2010, p. 3). 
71
  Tom TODD, “Unicameral or Bicameral State Legislatures… cit.”, p. 6. 
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Comment:  
The bicameralists’ competitive advantage thesis that, since it deliberates (usually, but not exclusively) 
on what the first one has done72, the second Chamber may exert the function of administrative oversight as 
a subset of its reflective role73, seems rather prescriptive and tacitly assumes inter-Chamber incongruence; 
in the more general conclusion of Meg Russell, “Recent theoretical expositions of the benefits of 
bicameralism are based on implicit assumptions that second Chambers [all] have these three attributes 
[i.e. symmetry, incongruence, and adequately perceived legitimacy]”74. Equally true, unicameralists 
seem to ignore a multitude of other political system variables – inter-Chamber (in-)congruence, (un-) 
regulated transparency and accountability of parliamentary activity, party discipline etc. 
 
a) Between the Legislative and the Executive 
Argument:  
Reflects government policy more efficiently 
and coherently.  
 
Critique:  
Misbalanced executive-legislative power 
relation in favour of the government, even 
more so if party and executive leaderships 
coincide, as a parliamentary and governing 
majority will never willingly overthrow its 
own government. 
 
Rebuttal:  
Aside from the aforementioned external 
instruments and agencies controlling the 
legislative, in the other direction, the political 
identity of Parliament majority and 
government reflects vox populi and, 
furthermore, ensures the political system’s 
stability and functionality. 
Argument:  
Provides enhanced oversight and control of 
the Executive; for reasons related to 
eligibility age, tenure, selection procedures, 
etc., members of second Chambers are more 
independent of the executive, and 
subsequently more effective in controlling it.  
 
Critique:  
Generally speaking, the partitioning of the 
Legislative reduces its authority and effectiveness 
in relation to the executive. Moreover, the above 
argument refers strictly to incongruent 
bicameral Parliaments. Even so, and even when 
not considering the risk of instability (or, 
alternatively, of institutional gridlock), the issue 
seems rather two-faced: a second Chamber may 
theoretically be more autonomous in relation to 
the executive, but the latter can rely on the other 
Chamber, always elected and thus of superior 
legitimacy, to counter the influence of the first.  
 
Rebuttal:  
One obstacle to government abuse is still 
better than none. And generally speaking, 
more legislators, committees and leaders 
mean inherently more capacity and expertise, 
and therefore greater authority and 
independence in relation to the executive. 
Comment:  
As it has been duly noticed, “members of governing parties in parliamentary lower Chambers must 
tread a difficult line – balancing the roles of checking the executive branch whilst supporting their 
party in power”75. In the aggravating context of the globalization-led pressure exerted on legislatives 
in favour of executives76, the paradox that “the very system intended to ensure Parliament’s control 
over the executive has led to exactly the opposite flow of control”77 suits the unicameral systems 
                                                 
72
  Philip NORTON, “Adding Value?... cit.”, p. 7. 
73
  See Robert PAKENHAM, “Legislatures and Political Development”, in Allan 
KORNBERG, Lloyd D. MUSOLF (eds.), Legislatures in Developmental Perspective, 
Duke University Press, Durham, 1970, pp. 521-582. 
74
  Meg RUSSELL, “What Are Second Chambers… cit.”, p. 456. 
75
  Ibidem, p. 447. Not coincidentally, Aristotle, who prefaced the theory of the separation of 
powers, Locke, who explicated it, and Montesquieu, who developed it, all have written their 
works before the historical emergence of political parties. 
76
  Saskia SASSEN, Territory, Authority, Rights… cit.  
77
  David M. OLSON, Democratic Legislative Institutions: A Comparative View, M.E. Sharpe, 
Armonk, NY, 1994, p. 77. 
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par excellence, where the common sense critique advanced by bicameralists seems supported 
by empirical evidence worldwide.  
Equally true, the bicameralist argument refers, as in so many other cases, specifically, although 
not explicitly to incongruent and symmetrical bicameral Parliaments, in which the upper 
Chamber usually cannot revoke a government, but is able to at least exert some pressure on the 
lower Chamber, by raising awareness of and co-interesting the public opinion. 
 
Accountability and transparency 
Argument:  
One single legislative body solely and 
entirely responsible to the people. 
Compared to [2] systems, [1] are transparent, 
with fewer elected officials to monitor and 
hold to account, and with no scapegoat. 
Legislative procedures are easy (or at least 
easier by comparison) to understand and 
follow by electors, which further enhances 
the legislators’ attentiveness and responsibility. 
Critique:  
Undermines accountability of individual 
legislators by clouding their responsibility for 
decisions. 
 
Rebuttal:  
Bicameralism practices a dual accountability, 
analogous to the one within presidential 
systems, where electors vote separately for 
the head of the executive and for the legislative, 
both responsible for determining public 
policy and accountable to the electorate.  
 
Counterargument:  
The analogy implies distinguishable 
responsibility, applicable only to symmetric 
and directly elected Chambers, which are a 
rarity. In congruent bicameral systems of 
unitary systems, “the term ‘redundancy’ is far 
more appropriate”; “if control of the two 
Chambers is divided, then the second – in the 
words of Abbé Sieyès – is mischievous, 
because it challenges the accountability of the 
first”78. “If two Chambers disagree and either 
fail to resolve their difference, or resolve 
them through doing deals, who then do the 
electors hold to account for the outcomes of 
public policy?”79. 
 
Rebuttal:  
To diffuse Government authority is to diffuse 
responsibility. Most of today’s legislatures 
are not unicameral, nor entirely elected by 
uninominal voting, let alone by first-past-the-post 
electoral systems, so that the responsibility of 
each legislator will always remain ambiguous. 
Eliminating the second house, though it may 
change tactics, won’t end strategy, but will 
only make it adapt. MPs will continue to 
jockey to improve their bargaining position 
                                                 
78
  Apud Rod HAGUE, Martin HARROP, Comparative Government and Politics. An 
Introduction, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, p. 306. 
79
  Philip NORTON, “Adding Value?... cit.”, pp. 11-12. 
80
  Tom TODD, “Unicameral or Bicameral State Legislatures… cit.”, p. 5. 
Unicameralism versus Bicameralism Revisited. The Case of Romania 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XIV  no. 1  2014 
73 
and to yield / divert responsibility.80 
Transparency 
Argument:  
The simplicity and transparency of the 
unicameral model reduces the influence of 
professional representation of powerful 
interests and enhances the influence of less 
organized and moneyed citizens; additionally, 
it avoids inter-Chamber negotiations 
concealed behind the curtain81 
Critique:  
More complicated, less transparent, 
susceptible to favouring illegitimate interests. 
 
Rebuttal:  
Bicameral Parliaments may be less 
transparent and simple, but paid lobbyists 
need the support of a larger number of 
leaders, committee chairs and MPs. 
Comment:  
Accountability and transparency are also conditioned by other variables of the specific political 
system, such as civic activism, directness and regularity of voter-legislator contact, party 
discipline, the degree of overlapping between the upper and the lower Chambers legislators’ 
constituencies, national regulations of the lobbying activity etc. Furthermore, and hinting at the 
in part sterile character of the debate over accountability, the representative, and not 
imperative, nature of today’s political systems means that the accountability of legislators 
materialises exclusively in them being not re-elected, a pressure further diminished in the case 
of indirectly or appointed legislators. 
 
Legislative stability 
Argument:  
The identity of parliamentary majority and 
executive branch in terms of political 
makeup reflects the people’s will and 
guarantees stability. 
Argument:  
1.    Especially incongruent and symmetrical 
bicameral systems produce more stable 
decisions: more autonomous in relation to 
both the executive and the electorate82, 
second Chambers may act as a brake to the 
first one, which is elected directly, for 
usually shorter terms, and subsequently 
more prone to radicalism83; thus, the upper 
house provides a “sober second thought”84 – a 
                                                 
81
   Ibidem, p. 3. 
82
   As a resultant of different selection method (frequently indirect, implying less susceptibility 
to both constituency and executive pressures), higher minimum age eligibility requisite 
(meaning they will tend to have better formed views and be at a later stage of their careers), 
usually longer terms etc. 
83
   Whereas second Chambers are described occasionally as modern “Elders’ Councils”, able to 
address topics in a less partisan manner (see Bogdan DIMA, “Parlament bicameral…. cit.”, p. 30. 
84
   John MacDONALD, the first Canadian prime minister, apud Meg RUSSELL, “What Are 
Second Chambers… cit.”, pp. 450, 451. 
85
   Ibidem. 
86
   Tom TODD, “Unicameral or Bicameral State Legislatures… cit.”, p. 3. 
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“valuable asset in an otherwise party-
dominated Parliament”85.  
 
Critique:  
Aside from referring only to (highly) 
incongruent systems, the underlying principle 
that “passions of the lower chamber would be 
restrained by wiser, more conservative 
representatives of wealth and property in the 
Senate is a relic of history”86.  
2.    Incongruence additionally acts as a 
stability supplier, as it contributes to 
overcome the production of cyclic majorities87. 
Comment:  
Of a rather exceptional nature, the bicameralists’ argument applies only to incongruent and 
simultaneously and reasonably symmetrical legislatures, with differentiated tenures. In today’s 
EU for instance, out of twelve bicameral legislatures, at most half of them meet cumulatively 
the two criteria (Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, and Spain88). Moreover, as 
with previous arguments, this one requires a contextualization by other characteristics of the 
specific political system, including the electoral system. 
The normative argument regarding cyclic majorities not only needs a much broader approach 
in terms of Condorcet’s paradox, but also questions almost directly alternation in power as a 
theoretically fundamental pillar of democracy. 
 
Efficiency 
a) In terms of money and other resources 
Argument:  
Smallest possible costs to government and 
taxpayers. 
 
Critique:  
1. Subversive implicit assumption that 
unicameral automatically means less 
legislators89, which is not necessarily the case; 
2. A reduction of numbers inherently 
endangers the decision-making quality 
(see below). 
Critique:  
Redundancy; duplication of consumed 
resources.  
 
Rebuttal:  
1. The critique applies only to highly 
congruent systems, with no functional 
inter-Chamber partitioning;  
2. The cost of a legislature represents a tiny 
fraction of the aggregate cost of state 
government – is this tiny possible 
discount worth the risk of compromising 
the quality of decision-making?90. 
Comment:  
The bicameralist criticism of the unicameralists’ widespread logical fallacy seems justified. 
Actually, for the top ten most populated unicameral and bicameral systems, the first category 
                                                                                                                       
87
   Andrés MALAMUD, Martín COSTANZO, “Subnational Bicameralism… cit.”. 
88
   To which one might add France’s moderately asymmetrical and incongruent legislature 
(as classified by Arend LIJPHART, Democracies… cit., pp. 192 f.f.). 
89
  An assumption sometimes even explicit (though usually referring contextually to congruent 
bicameral parliaments in unitary states), e.g. “smaller, less costly to operate” (Tom TODD, 
“Unicameral or Bicameral State Legislatures… cit.”, p. 11); “halving of electoral sinecures” 
(Ion DELEANU, Instituţii şi proceduri constituţionale… cit., pp. 613-614; own italics added). 
90
  Tom TODD, “Unicameral or Bicameral State Legislatures… cit.”, p. 11. 
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registers a higher average number of MPs (687.1 vs. 604.5).  
Equally true, citizens in unicameral systems seem better represented in terms of the combined 
parliamentary representation norm (i.e. 1 member of Parliament to how many country 
inhabitants), which is even more intriguing when considering that, at least in federal states, 
upper Chambers represent states/regions, which implies a further reduced representation of the 
people in the lower Chamber as compared to unicameral systems. 
 
Table 5 
Top 10 Most Populated Bicameral, Respectively Unicameral Systems by Number of Legislators, 
Country Population and Aggregate de facto Parliamentary Representation Norm 
 
Bicameral Systems Unicameral Systems 
Country MPs Popul. (mil.) 
Repres. 
norm (k.) Country MPs 
Popul. 
(mil.) 
Repres. 
norm (k.) 
India 790 1,220.8 1,545.3 China 2,987 1,349.6 451.8 
U.S. 535 316.7 519.9 Bangladesh 350 163.6 467.6 
Indonesia 692 251.2 362.9 Vietnam 500 92.5 184.9 
Brazil 594 210.0 338.4 Iran 290 79.8 275.4 
Pakistan 446 193.2 433.3 Turkey 550 80.7 146.7 
Nigeria 469 174.5 372.0 South Korea 687 48.9 71.3 
Russia 616 142.5 231.3 Tanzania 357 48.3 135.2 
Japan 964 127.3 132.0 Ukraine 450 44.6 99.0 
Mexico 628 116.2 185.0 Uganda 375 34.8 92.7 
Philippines 311 105.7 339.9 Iraq 325 31.9 98.0 
average 604.5 285.8 446.0 average 687.1 197.4 202.2 
 
Based on data provided by Parliaments’ websites and CIA World 
Factbook 2013. 
However, aside from pure numbers of legislators, what additionally and 
more importantly counts is the aggregated cost related to the Parliament, be it 
uni- or bi-cameral, and not so much absolutely, but proportionally to other 
indicators such as GDP, average national income, etc. 
 
b) In terms of functionality 
Argument:  
Decisive, timely, effective.  
Quicker enactment of proposed legislation, 
no time-consuming inter-Chamber 
differences to reconcile, no navettes, no joint 
committees, no re-examination. 
 
Critique:  
Speed per se, at the expense of quality and/or 
responsibility? Speed and attention are 
Critique:  
Likelihood, even if only for psychological 
reasons (i.e. inter-Chamber jealousy, friction, 
rivalry, thus making law adoption difficult, 
sometimes even impossible) of decisional 
gridlock (in congruent) or at least of a 
slowing down (in incongruent systems) of the 
law-making process, and, finally, to debatable 
solutions of divergence management91.  
 
                                                 
91
  Ion DELEANU, Instituţii şi proceduri constituţionale… cit., p. 613.  
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inversely proportional. Rebuttal:  
(Quasi-perfect) congruent and symmetrical 
bicameral systems are extremely rare. 
Moreover, divergences may actually reflect 
the (different) view(s) of the people. 
Comment:  
Efficiency needs to be addressed two-dimensionally, not only objectively, in terms of possible 
standardised performance indicators, but also – and crucially – subjectively, in terms of the 
public opinion’s perception. Additionally, Philip Norton’s above-mentioned distinction 
between function, capacity, and political will of a parliamentary Chamber seems extremely 
useful, the third one being a critical factor of the likelihood of legislative delays or gridlocks. 
 
Decision-making quality 
Critique:  
Unicameralism doesn’t possess the “safety 
valve” against flawed legislation that a 
second Chamber provides. 
 
Rebuttal:  
1. Adopted laws are constitutionally 
controlled and subject to judicial 
contestation, while legislators can, and in 
the case of flawed legislation, should, 
reintroduce a new bill correcting the 
previous one.  
2. Moreover, legislators of a unicameral 
system are able to proceed thoroughly and 
carefully, as they are relieved of the need 
to move legislation through a cumber 
stone process involving two houses. 
3. If truly needed, “safety valves” can be 
engineered within the single Chamber, 
without generating a new Chamber for 
this sole purpose. 
 
Counterarguments:  
1. “Prevention is better than cure”; the 
above-mentioned are merely instruments 
of a posteriori control, when the harm has 
already been done. 
The constructive deterrence/coercion exerted 
by a second Chamber is probably more effective 
than the above-mentioned lack of pressure. 
Philosophy:  
“Two eyes are better than one”92. 
 
Arguments:  
1. When it comes to critical decision-making, 
“redundancy” has an „institutional 
value”93, becoming a “virtue”94. 
Providing a “second opinion”95, an upper 
Chamber multiplies opportunities for 
debate and reflection and facilitates a 
more deliberative approach to legislation, 
thus preventing/hindering the passage of 
flawed legislation.  
 
Counterargument:  
a.) Not rarely, bicameral legislatures are 
forced to take shortcuts and use fast track 
proceedings that condense committee and 
floor debate and eliminate opportunities 
for deliberation and reflection;  
b.) “Quite contrary to theory, experience 
shows that the presence of a second 
house encourages and enables legislative 
carelessness”96, each Chamber relying on 
the other to correct mistakes or reject the 
flawed bill;  
2. Able to postpone law adoption, the second 
Chamber offers a protection from the first 
Chamber’s possible legislating excess.97 
 
 
                                                 
92
   Giovanni SARTORI, Comparative Constitutional Engineering… cit., p. 251. 
93
  Samuel C. PATTERSON, Anthony MUGHAN, op. cit., p. 15. 
94
   Tom TODD, “Unicameral or Bicameral State Legislatures… cit.”, p. 9. 
95
  Kenneth C. WHEARE, Legislatures, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, p. 140. 
96
  Tom TODD, “Unicameral or Bicameral State Legislatures… cit.”, p. 10. 
97
  Bogdan DIMA, “Parlament bicameral… cit.”, p. 30. 
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Counterargument:  
Introducing a new problem does not solve the 
initial one (since there is no a priori reason to 
assume the second Chamber would differ in 
attitude, all the less in congruent systems).  
3. Even the congruent type of bicameralism 
might improve the efficiency of decision-
making, as it enhances the informational 
process98. 
Comment:  
Aside from Sartori’s obvious argumentum ad naturam, both argumentation lines omit the 
crucial factor of the legislators’ necessary, or at least desirable, expertise; if the second 
Chamber’s members are equally (un-)expert in the matter to be legally regulated, multiplying 
numbers is not the solution, since legislators will, at best, follow the recommendations of their 
advisors, or, at worst, either don’t care, or adopt a populist solution. This punctual observation 
in turn opens a wholly new, generic, and consequential discussion about legislators’ eligibility 
and expertise and about the complexity of the legislative activity in today’s societies. 
 
Customs and tradition:  
This argument, already exemplified above, within the approach of historical factors on Parliament 
structure, does not develop along the uni- vs. bi-cameral debate line, but within each country, and 
reflects entirely different alignments. For the particular case of Romania, the elements of tradition 
shall be discussed in the next part of the study. 
 
To conclude to the here completed inventory of nine main structural and 
procedural criteria instrumented in the comparative analysis of unicameralism 
and bicameralism, a first necessary remark emphasizes the above clarified 
necessity to distinguish, for each employed criterion, to which type of 
bicameralism the argument refers, each of them featuring a specific set of 
arguments and counterarguments. Thus, the incongruent and symmetric version 
of bicameralism seems the only one reasonably superior to the unicameral 
model. At the same time, any admissible comparison needs to expand from 
beyond an in vitro approach towards taking into account a multitude of 
interfering independent variables characteristic to a specific pair of political 
system and culture. 
Essentially, the debate seems unsettled by five criteria: sovereignty – with 
the unicameralists’ criticism of the bicameral model reasonably refuted; civic 
participation – in regard to which it doesn’t seem clear which of the two models 
encourages/discourages more the involvement of citizens in the legislative 
process; the legislative stability, although, at least empirically and refrained to 
Europe, unicameralists appear to make a stronger case; the quality of the 
                                                                                                                       
98
  See James R. ROGERS (“An Informational Rationale for Congruent Bicameralism”, 
Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 13, no. 2, 2001, pp. 123-151), who builds a game 
theory model with informational uncertainty and perfectly identical chambers in terms of 
their political makeup. 
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decision-making, with each of the two cases credibly refuted by the other 
debating side; respectively customs and tradition, an entirely subjective criterion 
to be instrumented within each country, and not in a trans-border format.  
As for the remaining four indicators, bicameralists make a compelling 
argument in favour of their model in terms of representation within federal or 
regional states (whereas in unitary homogenous states without prominent local 
identities, a second Chamber seems redundant, as argued by the unicameralists), 
while the incongruent and symmetrical type of a two-Chamber Parliament 
seems also superior to the unicameral model in that it ensures a more efficient 
checks and balances mechanism, at least between the executive and the 
legislative branches. Oppositely, “the compelling argument for a unicameral 
legislature is the need to ensure accountability”99, while efficiency seems at 
least theoretically riskier, or harder to be achieved within bicameral legislatures. 
 
 
 
THE CASE OF CONTEMPORARY ROMANIA 
 
 
The current, according to many opinions undesirable, status quo in terms 
of Parliament structure and especially functionality is a resultant of both 
historical factors and a post-1989 publicly perceived elite’s incapacity and/or 
lack of political will towards increasing the effectiveness of Romania’s 
institutional architecture in general, and of its Parliament in particular. 
 
 
Historical Background of Romania’s Parliament Structure100 
 
Departing from the previous community assemblies of unicameral type 
that had extensively represented social categories on a census-vote-basis prior 
                                                 
99
  Philip NORTON, “Adding Value?... cit.”, p. 11. 
100
  The following represents an extremely summarizing approach. For a broader historical 
overview, see Keith HITCHINS, A Concise History of Romania, Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 2014, pp. 112 f.f. For a narrower approach of the political system 
during the Communist Regime, see Dennis DELETANT, Romania under Communist 
Rule (2nd ed.), The Center for Romanian Studies; Civic Academy Foundation, Iaşi, 
Oxford, Portland, 1999. Ioan Stanomir provides an excellent summary of Romania’s 
Constitutional evolution in “The Temptation of the West: The Romanian Constitutional 
Tradition”, in Mihaela CZOBOR-LUPP, J. Stefan LUPP (eds.) Moral, Legal and Political 
Values in Romanian Culture, The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 
Washington, DC, 2002, pp. 75-97. For a comparison of post-Communist and interwar 
Romania especially in regard to electoral systems, see Cristian PREDA, România 
postcomunistă şi România interbelică, Meridiane, Bucureşti, 2002.  
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to the reign of Al.I. Cuza, the 1866 Constitution, largely inspired by the Belgian 
one of 1831101, attributed legislative power jointly to the monarch and to a 
bicameral “National Representation” (art. 31), comprising the Assembly of 
Deputies and the Senate (art. 32)102. The system displayed incongruence, as the 
deputies’ tenures lasted four years, while the senators were in part de jure 
members and in part elected by census suffrage for an eight-year mandate, half 
of them being renewed every four years. 
Adopted in the aftermath of World War One, “Greater” Romania’s 1923 
Constitution103 preserved the bicameral, asymmetrical and incongruent structure 
of the Parliament, made up by: the Assembly of Deputies, comprising members 
elected by universal, equal, direct, mandatory and secret vote (art. 64) for a 
four-year term (art. 62), the age requisite being minimum 25 years (art. 66(c)); 
the Senate, which combined territorial, socio-occupational and religious 
representation criteria, comprising: (a) elected members, by the same procedure 
and for the same tenure as deputies, but with a minimum age required of 40 
years): one senator for each county, indirectly elected by county and local 
councils (art. 69); one senator per county per occupational category, elected by 
the Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Labour, and Agriculture (art. 70); one 
senator for each state university, elected by and from within their professors 
(art. 71); (b) a variety of de jure members104. 
King Charles II’s 1938 Constitution preserved the bicameral legislature 
structure, its article 31 stipulating: “The legislative power is exerted by the King 
through the agency of the National Representation, which is divided in two 
assemblies: the Senate and the Assembly of Deputies”. The two Chambers 
differed significantly in terms of selection procedure, political composition, 
number of seats, tenure, and powers, making the envisaged parliament highly 
incongruent and asymmetrical: Deputies (required to be at least 18 years old 
and practice agriculture, manual labour, commerce, industry, or intellectual 
occupations) were elected on the basis of a uninominal system, by a secret, 
mandatory and freely expressed vote for a six-year term (art. 61); the half-sized 
Senate comprised three categories of members: (a) appointed by the King; (b) 
de jure members – the (adult) heir apparent; princes of the Royal Family; the 
Romanian Orthodox Patriarch and Metropolitans; the heads of officially-recognized 
                                                 
101
  Ioan STANOMIR, “The Temptation of the West… cit.”,. pp. 87-88. 
102
  See text of the 1866 Constitution at http://www.cdep.ro/ pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act 
_text?idt=37755 (retrieved March 2014).  
103
  Full Romanian text at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=1517 
(retrieved March 2014). 
104
  Among which: the heir apparent (starting with his 18th birthday); the state-recognized 
religious denominations; the president of the Romanian Academy; for prime ministers and 
ministers having served for at least four, respectively six years, former Armed Forces 
chiefs of staff etc. (art. 72-73). 
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religious denominations; (c) elected members, by the same procedure as 
deputies, but for a 9-year tenure, 1/3 of them renewed every 3 years (art. 63-64).  
After World War II and Marshal Antonescu’s dictatorship, marked by a 
suspension of any parliamentary activity, bicameralism was briefly reinstated in 
1944, only to be replaced in 1946105 by the emerging Communist power with a 
unicameral Great National Assembly, confirmed as such by the Constitutions of 
1948 (art. 37), 1952 (art. 22), and 1965 (art. 42), in what represented a typically 
Communist marionette-legislature. 
Bicameralism was re-established after the regime change of 1989, by the 
Provisional Council for National Unity’s Law-Decree No. 92 of March 14, 1990, a 
de facto provisional Constitution whose article 3 referred to the Parliament as 
comprising the Assembly of Deputies and the Senate106. The new state of fact 
was confirmed by the 1991 Constitution, whose article 58(2) – “Parliament 
consists of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate”107 – was preserved in 
article 61(2) of the 2003-revised version of the fundamental law108. 
 
 
The Current Problem-situation 
 
The rationale underlying the 1991 option for bicameralism has been 
explained in the literature as both a return to pre-Communist tradition and a way 
of articulating a new constitutional identity by legitimizing the differentiation 
from the Communist unicameralism and, with disregard however for the 
Senate’s traditional role of elite’s and specialized representation, so that the 
country’s transition legislature became and remained highly congruent. Partly 
acknowledging this problem, the 2003 Constitution revision, abolishing the 
inter-Chamber mediation procedure and establishing a law-defined, theme-
related, albeit arbitrary, differentiation between a first notified, reflective and a 
second, decisional Chamber, has managed to alter the previous quasi-perfect 
egalitarianism only to a minor degree109.  
                                                 
105
  Prime minister Petru Groza’s Law Decree of June 17, 1946, abolished the Senate, a 
decision reconfirmed by the new Electoral Law of July 15, 1946.  
106
  Romanian text at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=7528 (retrieved 
March 2014). 
107
  English text at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?den=act1_2&par1=3#t3c1s1a58 
(retrieved March 2014).  
108
  For other information about Romania’s parliamentary history, see, inter alia, Tudor 
DRĂGANU, Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice. Tratat Elementar, Lumina Lex, 
Bucureşti, 2000, pp. 90-91; Sorin BOCANCEA (coord.), Constituţia României. Opinii 
esenţiale pentru legea fundamentală, Institutul European, Iaşi, 2012; Cynthia CURT, 
“Modele bicamerale comparate... cit.”, p. 28; Bogdan DIMA, “Parlament bicameral…cit.”; 
Claudia GILIA, „Reformarea sistemului constituţional... cit.”, p. 164.  
109
  Cynthia CURT, “Modele bicamerale comparate... cit.”, p. 30.  
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The public debate and, consequently, the academic one, have been 
reignited in 2009, when President Traian Băsescu successfully initiated a 
referendum, simultaneously with the first round of the presidential elections, in 
which he was participating for a second term, regarding two issues: the 
establishing of a unicameral Parliament and a reduction of parliamentary seats 
to at most 300. The results marked a landslide victory of the president and his 
supporting party against essentially all other political parties and alliances: in a 
total turnout of 50.94%, no less than 77.78%, respectively 88.84% of the valid 
votes approved the unicameral, respectively size reduced Parliament 
Constitutional initiative110. However, despite the magnitude of popular support, 
the initiative registered no legally-required follow up in a Parliament where all 
parties openly boycotted the revision project.  
Finally, after a spectacular, though negative-vote-based, victory in the 
parliamentary elections of 2012, the new parliamentary and governing majority 
of the Social-Liberal Union, which had already changed the electoral law 
towards establishing a now-in-session 588-seats parliament, initiated its own 
Constitution revision project which, however, doesn’t consider any Parliament 
size reduction, nor a change of its bicameral structure, despite some, admittedly 
marginal, public voices insisting on it. 
Apart from the decision-making and the public agenda as well, the 
academic community quasi-unanimously agrees on the status quo’s 
undesirability, although opinions vary significantly as to what the best remedies 
to the acknowledged problem-situation would be. Thus, quite unique throughout 
Europe, the Romanian bicameralism type has been widely classified as 
egalitarian in both fundamental dimensions, i.e. congruence and symmetry, by 
both local and foreign scholars111. 
Various measurement instruments, advanced in time by various scholars 
and practitioners as well, do confirm this almost axiomatic opinion. Focusing 
her study on Latin America’s bicameral Parliaments, but with worldwide 
applicability, Mariana Llanos for instance elaborated in 2002 two indexes of 
parliamentary incongruence, respectively symmetry, which I find useful for any 
inter-country comparison along the parliamentary dimension. Llanos’ first index 
comprises ten dimensions representing institutional mechanisms and procedures 
that foster incongruence: 1.) electoral system – 1.a) districts and formula; 
                                                 
110
  Meaning that even large chunks of the opposition candidates’ voters approved Băsescu’s 
initiative. For more data, see the validation decision of the Constitutional Court at 
http://lege5.ro/Gratuit/geztcmbrge/hotararea-nr-37-2009-referitoare-la-respectarea-proced 
urii-pentru-organizarea-si-desfasurarea-referendumului-national-din-data-de-22-
noiembrie-2009-si-la-confirmarea-rezultatelor-acestuia (retrieved March 2014). 
111
  See, inter alia, Arend LIJPHART, Modele ale democraţiei... cit., pp. 192-193; Cynthia 
CURT, “Modele bicamerale comparate... cit.”, pp. 28-30; Ioan MURARU, Mihai 
CONSTANTINESCU, Drept parlamentar… cit., p. 72; Tudor DRĂGANU, Drept 
constituţional… cit. 
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1.b) minorities’ special representation; 1.c) appointments; 1.d) indirect 
elections; 2.) Chambers’ size; 3.) requisites for being elected in the upper 
Chamber – 3.a.) age; 3.b) other requisites; 4.) tenure; 5.) Chamber’s renewal – 
5.a) synchronicity of renewal; 5.b) simultaneousness of election. The second 
index comprises six dimensions corresponding to institutional mechanisms and 
procedures that foster inter-Chamber symmetry: 1.) legislative attributes of the 
upper Chamber; 2.) origin of the bills; 3.) resolution of disagreements; 
4.) executive control instruments – 4.a) investigation and interpellation; 
4.b) one Chamber’s (usually the upper one) participation in appointments; 
4.c) bicameral division of tasks for impeachment112.  
Transposing Llanos’ instruments, Romania’s Parliament would register 
average scores of 6 in terms of incongruence, on a scale from 0 (extreme 
congruence) to 26 (extreme incongruence), respectively 16 in terms of 
symmetry, on a scale from 0 (extreme asymmetry) to 18 (extreme symmetry), 
figures that classify it as extremely symmetrical and highly congruent, in what 
thus represents a quantifiable confirmation of an overwhelming opinion already 
expressed in time by scholars.  
A text analysis of the 2003 Constitution easily highlights this profoundly 
egalitarian format; stipulated by the fundamental law, the two Chambers 
display: an identical selection method (universal, equal, direct, secret and freely 
expressed vote) (art. 62(1)113; An identical mixed electoral system applied 
(art. 62(3) and subsidiary electoral law); a simultaneousness of their 
elections (art. 63(2), which further enhances the congruence derived by the first 
two provisions114; an identical (constituency) representation type of mandate 
(art. 69)115 , translatable in equal legitimacy and authority; an identical and 
overlapping 4-year tenure (art. 63(1); an equal independence in both internal 
organization and budgeting (art. 64(1)-(5)); identical and simultaneous reunions 
in twice-a-year ordinary sessions (art. 66(1); an identical term-prolongation 
regulating framework (art. 63(2); an identical incompatibility set (art. 71); an 
                                                 
112
  Mariana LLANOS, “El bicameralismo en América Latina”, paper presented at the Tercer 
Congreso Latinoamericanistas Europeos, Amsterdam, July 3-6, 2002; pp. 354-355, 359, 
364 (http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/librev/rev/dconstla/cont/2003/pr/pr20.pdf, 
last accessed 25 April 2014) 
113
  Unlike for instance the relatively similarly congruent case of Poland, where senators are 
elected by a majority vote on provincial basis, while members of the Sejm are elected for 
an equal 4-year term, but on the basis of a complex system of proportional representation.  
114
  Unlike the system of the Czech Republic, where deputies serve a 4-year term, while 
senators a 6-year one, with one third of them renewed every two years (see article 16(1)-(2) of 
the Constitution of the Czech Republic at http://www.psp.cz/cgi-bin/eng/docs/laws/199 
3/1.html (last accessed March 2014). 
115
  Unlike the otherwise similar case of the Italian Parliament, whose Chambers share the 
same electoral system, but, specifically, the senators are elected on a regional basis 
(articles 56-57 of the Italian Constitution, available at http://www.senato.it/docum 
enti/repository/istituzione/ costituzione_inglese.pdf, last accessed March 2014). 
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identical parliamentary immunity (art. 72); an identical right to legislative 
initiative, both Chambers being able to adopt laws, decisions, and motions, 
provided an (identical) absolute majority quorum (art. 67). 
This combined high congruence and symmetry, not even mitigated by 
such minor differences as the ones regulated in the Czech, Italian or Polish 
types of bicameralism, has been criticized especially for perpetuating inefficient 
and redundant parallelisms116. Even a detailed research in Constitutional 
provisions relevant to the issue highlights a mere five noteworthy, but actually 
rather formal than substantial, differences between the two houses:  
 
a.) The minimum age eligibility requisite – 23 years for deputies vs. 33 
for senators (Constitution art. 37(2)); 
b.) The interim of the Presidency office, assigned, in order, to the 
President of the Senate, and then to the one of the Chamber of 
Deputies (Constitution art. 98(1)) – a difference related rather to 
people than Chambers; 
c.) The presence, confined to the Chamber of Deputies, of a 
representative for each officially recognized national minority whose 
organization doesn’t overcome the standard electoral threshold 
(Constitution art. 62(2)) – the only de jure and a priori inter-Chamber 
difference in terms of political make-up, the others being usually 
generated by the “political migration” phenomenon; 
d.) The Chambers’ sizes, calculated on the basis of an every-four-years 
changing law that regulates the representation norms of deputies 
and senators: 
  
Table 6 
Romania’s Post-1989 Number of Parliamentarians  
by Chamber and Legislature117 
 
Deputies Senators MPs 
 
Legislature No. % No. % 
Total 
1990-1992 396 76.9 119 23.1 515 
1992-1996 328 69.6 143 30.4 471 
1996-2000 343 70.6 143 29.4 486 
2000-2004 345 71.1 140 28.9 485 
2004-2008 332 70.8 137 29.2 469 
2008-2012 334 70.9 137 29.1 471 
2012 – present 412 70.0 176 30.0 588 
 
                                                 
116
  Ramona DUMINICĂ, Andreea DRĂGHICI, “A Few Considerations... cit.”, p. 76. 
117
  Parliament website figures (http://www.parlament.ro).  
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e.) The specific prerogative of the Senate to validate the Superior 
Council of Magistracy members elected by general assemblies of 
magistrates (Constitution art. 133(2)).  
 
Aside from these few minor differences, all deliberation and legislation 
topics subsumable to what might be considered “national interest” require joint 
sittings of the two Chambers, in which (22) cases – it has been justifiably 
argued – the legislative virtually functions as a single-Chamber Parliament118: 
debate of the proposed government programme and list, and expressing a vote 
of confidence (Constitution art. 103(3)); adoption of a motion of censure (no 
confidence vote) (art. 112(1)); debate of the programme, general policy 
statement, or bill upon which the government takes responsibility (art. 114(1)); 
re-examination, upon request of the President, of a law passed (114(4)); 
examination of reports issued by the Supreme Council of National Defence and 
of those of the Court of Audit (art. 65(2-g) and 140(2)); appointment of 
intelligence services’ directors (art. 65(2-h)); receiving the message of the 
President of Romania (art. 65(2-a)); approval of State and Social Security 
Budget (art. 65(2b); swearing-in of the elected president (art. 82(2)); issuing of 
a declaration of war, or of total or partial mobilization (art. 62 (2c,d)); adoption 
of cease-fire decision (art. 65(2e)); appointment of the Ombudsman and 
presentation of his/her reports (art. 65 (2i) and 60); impeachment of the 
President for high treason (art. 96(1)); suspension from office of the President 
(or the interim one) (art. 95(1) and 99); approval of the National Strategy for 
Defence (art. 65(2f)); approval of the state of emergency or siege established by 
the President (art. 93(1)); adoption of the deputies’ and senators’ statutes, their 
emoluments and other rights (art. 65(2j)); fulfilment of any other prerogatives 
which require joint sittings by Constitution or Standing Orders (art. 65(2k)), 
such as adoption of other declarations, messages or bills of political nature, 
proclamation of referendum results, celebration of certain national holidays or 
commemorations etc.119  
This set of objective shortcomings is doubled by the subjective 
component of public opinion and confidence in the legislature, one of constant 
extremely low values in comparison to both the average European values and 
the other national institutions or organizations surveyed. The following diachronic 
overview of Romanian public confidence in the parliament, measured over three 
waves of the European Values Survey highlights both the relative and absolute 
low confidence expressed since the regime change of 1989.  
 
 
                                                 
118
  Tudor DRĂGANU, Drept constituţional… cit., p. 90. 
119
  The last three situations have been identified by Emil BOC, Cynthia CURT, Instituţii 
politice şi proceduri constituţionale în România, Accent, Cluj-Napoca, 2006, p. 73. 
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Table 7 
Public Trust in Institutions over the Last 3 EVS Waves,  
Romania and Europe Average 
 
Institution 
EVS wave 1990 1999 2008 
Church RO 72.3 82.7 86.2 
Church Europe 52.1 53.6 59.1 
Armed Forces RO 82.2 82.6 76.2 
Armed Forces Europe 46.1 57.3 63.3 
Justice system RO 47.7 40.1 41.4 
Justice System Europe 51.1 45.0 49.0 
Press RO 27.8 38.5 43.5 
Press Europe 39.2 38.6 37.0 
Parliament RO 20.8 19.2 24.0 
Parliament Europe 42.5 35.3 39.4 
Civil service RO 30.6 27.3 30.7 
Civil Service Europe 40.4 40.0 47.6 
Education system RO 79.2 79.4 74.0 
Education system Europe 63.0 70.5 67.9 
Police RO 45.1 45.4 54.8 
Police Europe 59.1 56.4 62.1 
 
“RO” = Romania: “EU” = Europe sample average 
(% of “a great deal” + “quite a lot confidence” within valid answers)120 
 
It is in this very context of both objective shortcomings of the legislature 
and its subjective negative perception by the public, that Romanian 
constitutionalist Ion Deleanu, launched a virulent critique of the current 
Romanian Parliament: 
 
“In its current, artificially built form, featuring some novelty juridical fictions, 
such as the adoption of a law by its non-adoption, it offers an ‘exemplary’ paradox: formally, 
arithmetically, it is a ‘perfect’ bicameralism, as there are two – and thank God! – only two 
Chambers; functionally, it is a radically ‘imperfect’ bicameralism, as only of the Chambers 
issues the final ‘legislative verdict’. It is one of the most striking contradictions, one pro 
domo admitted with nonchalance by those who wanted to salvage their seats. But it is also 
one of the most unbearable situations, the two Chambers doing nothing else other than 
doubling the – anyway exorbitant, indecent, cynical – costs and the incompetence, 
mammothizing the extra casting”121,122. 
 
                                                 
120
  EVS integrated database available and operational (March 2014) at http://zacat.gesis.o 
rg/webview/index.jsp?object=http://zacat.gesis.org/obj/fCatalog/Catalog5, last accessed 
25 April 2014). 
121
  In the cinema meaning of the term. In the original Romanian expression: “mamutizând 
figuraţia”.  
122
  Ion DELEANU, Instituţii şi proceduri constituţionale… cit., p. 188. 
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Even the application of the aforementioned criteria of a comparative 
unicameral versus bicameral analysis remains futile. Thus, the generic 
bicameral model’s strongest two arguments do not apply to this country context 
as: firstly, Romania is a unitary state and, furthermore, ethno-linguistically and 
religiously highly homogenous, while local/regional identities seem reasonably 
weak; secondly, in terms of checks and balances, the remarkably high 
congruence of the current legislative structure, associated with the same 
supermajority within both houses, implies a minimal legislative pressure 
exerted on the executive. A contrario, the strongest unicameralist argument, i.e. 
accountability, combined with public perception, further speaks against the 
status quo, as do the every-four-year parliamentary elections, whose dominant 
feature seems to be a negative “against”, type of vote. In terms of efficiency, the 
current system may be effective in that it isn’t affected by gridlocks, but this is 
achieved on the expense of the legislature’s independence in relation to the 
executive, whereas in economic terms, disrespecting the 2009 referendum 
results and divergent to the steady population decrease123 , the Parliament’s 
aggregated size has been expanded in 2012 from 471 to 588 legislators.  
As for the other generally employable comparative criteria, the public 
participation in and monitoring of the legislative activity remains severely low, 
while the legislature offers no discernible reason to believe it might try to 
ameliorate the situation; the quality of decision-making, regardless of any 
possible objective measuring, is rather completely irrelevant given the public 
perception of it; the sovereignty argument of unicameralists is exiled as 
caducous by article 148(2) of the Constitution. At the end of the day, the only 
noteworthy justification of today’s unicameral configuration is formulated 
along the customs and tradition criterion and lies in the 72 years (1866-1938) of 
bicameralism of Romania’s pre-1989 history.  
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Essentially controversial institutions, second Chambers and, subsequently, 
the option for a unicameral or a bicameral Parliament, will most likely remain 
the subject of intense debate in the academic fields of Constitutional Law and 
Political Science for mainly five reasons: firstly, some of the very defining 
characteristics of second Chambers, as for instance a particular political theory-
rooted type of representation, one significantly different from the unicameralists’ 
one people – one sovereignty – one representation philosophy; secondly, the 
                                                 
123
  According to the National Institute of Statistics, from 21.680.974 in 2002 to 19.042.936 in 2011. 
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spectacularly high variety, in terms of both structure and procedures, of today’s 
roughly eighty bicameral legislatures worldwide and the virtual impossibility to 
conceptually unify them into a single model opposable to, by contrast, the 
parsimonious unicameral one; thirdly, in terms of structural and procedural criteria 
of comparative analysis, the consequential dilemma of the inseparable strengths 
and weaknesses of any existent or imagined legislature structure type – a 
dilemma roughly translatable as accountability plus efficiency (appraised by 
unicameralists) versus representation plus checks and balances (argued by 
bicameralists); fourthly and subsequently, the impossibility to mathematically 
model the classic debate’s arguments and counterarguments into a standardized 
methodological instrument that would enable a “ranking” of the unicameral and 
multiple bicameral models; finally, the significant and largely acknowledged 
fact that legislature structure represents a dependent variable, a resultant of 
multiple strongly interrelated and highly country-specific factors of both 
objective and subjective nature, ranging from history-bound state structure to 
population size.  
The last reason may thus explain, in terms of the uniqueness vs. similarity 
tension, why even a monitoring of the last two decades’ roughly twenty 
switches from unicameral to bicameral structures and vice-versa, although 
capturing a relatively clear trend in favour of bicameralism, does not add 
explanatory power, nor comparative usefulness, since in the majority of those 
cases, scholars and practitioners have identified various other country-specific 
factors of the Parliament’s subsequent institutional performance. 
From the same empirical point of view, Romania, whose bicameralism 
stands out as an exception in its neighbourhood, respects essentially all of the 
correlations between legislature structure and other state variables monitored 
throughout Europe, while its unitary state structure does not represent an 
anomaly, since, although federal states highly correlate with bicameral 
parliaments, the majority of the two-Chamber legislatures worldwide are 
actually located in unitary states. 
Leaving empirical aspects aside, a structural-functional approach to the 
country’s current bicameral configuration however pinpoints it as an extremely 
peculiar case, unique at least among European bicameral systems, one that, 
employing any of the above-detailed conceptual and methodological instruments, 
is classifiable as severely ineffective. Thus, in terms of the symmetry-congruence-
legitimacy analytical triad, apart from its extreme symmetry, insignificantly 
altered by the 2003 Constitution revision, it fosters a remarkably high 
congruence, which remains unaddressed as such, not even by some minor 
electoral or representational adjustments like the ones operated in the congruent 
bicameral systems of Italy, the Czech Republic, or Poland. Subsequently 
affected by numerous redundancies and parallelisms, completely disjointed 
from the fundamental rationale of the bicameral model, i.e. to represent 
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different interests, and additionally contextualized by a severely low public trust 
in the institution, Romania’s current bicameral structure ultimately fails, even in 
appealing to most important two arguments developed in favour of the 
bicameral model: both its Chambers, quasi-identical in their political makeup, 
represent constituencies, while in terms of checks and balances, the governing 
majority controls both Chambers, which translates into a misbalancing of the 
Legislative-Executive power relation in favour of the latter. Thus, eventually, 
any other format, from the pure unicameral to the ideal incongruent and 
symmetrical bicameral one, seems preferable to the Romania’s current 
parliamentary structure. 
Essentially, the country’s legislative problem lies not in a lack of 
solutions. Aside from various recommendations for generically increasing the 
Parliament’s effectiveness and functionality, scholars and practitioners alike 
have advanced over the last two decades a multitude of proposals regarding the 
bicameral format, aimed mostly at diminishing the degree of inter-Chamber 
congruence, and ranging: from differentiating the selection method of the 
Chambers’ members to introducing a Chamber-separated, administrative-territorial, 
respectively national representation; or from a mere reduction of parliamentary 
seats with the preservation of the bicameral structure, to entirely eliminating all 
the instances, classifiable as “of national interest”, in which the two Chambers 
act as a de facto unicameral Parliament. The problem lies rather in the lack of 
political will.  
